Patent Law as Public Law by La Belle, Megan M.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
Patent Law as Public Law 
Megan M. La Belle 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 41 (2012). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
2012]
PATENT LAW AS PUBLIC LAW
Megan M La Belle*
INTRODUCTION
Public law, or public impact, litigation takes many forms. The para-
digm of public law litigation includes structural challenges to public institu-
tions like segregated schools and overcrowded prisons,' yet it also encom-
passes employment discrimination, securities fraud, antitrust, and environ-
mental cases.2 In his seminal article on the subject, Professor Abram
Chayes explains that public law adjudication usually concerns complaints
about governmental conduct, and is characterized by complex party struc-
tures and requests for ongoing remedial measures that have widespread
effects on individuals not before the court.' Public law adjudication is fur-
ther typified by active judges who decide substantive matters and are re-
sponsible for the overall management of the suit.4
Patent litigation historically has been regarded as private law litiga-
tion, meaning "disputes between private parties about private rights."5 It has
been compared to property, contract, and tort litigation, all of which fall
within the realm of private law adjudication.6 Were patent litigation to con-
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Mark Rienzi, Jennifer Rothman, Heidi Schooner, Melissa Wasserman, Geoff Watson, and Elizabeth
Winston for their extremely valuable comments and suggestions. The author is also grateful to her
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1 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284
(1976); Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on
Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 342 (2011).
2 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284. But see William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adju-
dication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 414-16 (2001) (distinguishing securities and mass tort litigation from tradi-
tional public law adjudication).
3 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284.
4 id.
5 Id. at 1282.
6 See Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) ("A patent for an invention is as
much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and pro-
tected by the same sanctions."); In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("Patent infringement is properly classified as a tort, albeit one created by federal statute."); Davis
Airfoils, Inc. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 350, 352 (Ct. Cl. 1954) ("A patent is a contract between the
inventor and the public, the terms of which are formulated by the United States Patent Office.").
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sist exclusively of infringement claims-where an intellectual property
owner sues another for unauthorized use of his property-this analogy
might make sense.7 But patent suits today are not limited to infringement
claims; they consistently involve disputes over patent validity.8 Indeed,
patent validity is sometimes the only issue in dispute. And because ques-
tions of patent validity differ fundamentally from infringement, the private
law paradigm breaks down for modem patent litigation.
Unlike patent inflingement, the core issue in patent validity disputes is
governmental conduct, namely whether the U.S. Patent & Trademark Of-
fice ("PTO") made a mistake when it issued the patent.9 The answer to this
question-whether the invention was actually patentable-lies at the heart
of our patent system.'0 The aim of the U.S. patent system, as set forth in the
Constitution itself, is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."" The Constitution contemplates a quid pro quo in furtherance of this
objective: inventors disclose new and useful technologies to the public in
exchange for the limited exclusive right to use the patented invention.2 So
when the PTO mistakenly grants a patent, the inventor gets his reward, but
society gets nothing in return because the invention was not actually new or
useful. 3 Thus, invalid patents undermine the very purpose of our patent
system.
Questions of patent validity are raised in litigation in one of two ways.
Most often the issue is raised as a counterclaim or affirmative defense by a
defendant who has been sued for infringement. 4 The second but signifi-
cantly less common method is the affirmative testing of patent validity
through declaratory judgment actions. 5 However the issue of validity pre-
sents itself, the aftereffects of a successful validity challenge are identical:
the previously protected intellectual property enters the public domain and
creates a public good.'6 Competitors of the patent owner and consumers of
7 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (defining patent infringement); see infra Part IV (discussing the public
and private law characteristics of patent infringement claims).
8 Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent Litigants'
Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 410-11 (2007).
9 See infra Part 11 (setting out requirements for patentability).
10 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979) (noting "the strong federal policy
that only inventions which meet the rigorous requirements of patentability shall be withdrawn from the
public domain").
11 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
12 Id.; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
13 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (explaining that inventions covered by
invalid patents "are in reality a part of the public domain").
14 Dolak, supra note 8, at 410.
15 See infra Part lI.B (discussing patent declaratory judgment actions).
16 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971) (holding
that once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel prevents the patent owner from ever
asserting it again); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
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the patented product-parties who did not participate in the litigation-
benefit just like the party who successfully challenged the patent." Thus,
patent validity challenges are complaints about government conduct that
implicate important public interests and potentially affect many parties not
before the court. Validity disputes, therefore, fit within Professor Chayes's
paradigm of public law litigation.
A public law regime is most successful when a host of enforcement
mechanisms are available. In many areas of public law, there are well-
established systems of public enforcement through federal and state agen-
cies, as well as private enforcement mechanisms such as administrative
hearings and lawsuits.' Some of these mechanisms are available for pa-
tents. The PTO, for example, polices patents ex ante by examining patent
applications in an attempt to ensure that the invention satisfies all the re-
quirements of patentability. Moreover, the recently enacted Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act ("AIA") creates certain private enforcement measures,
namely a third party post-grant review proceeding to challenge patent valid-
ity at the PTO. 9 Yet, in contradistinction to many other public law regimes,
what the patent system lacks is robust privately initiated litigation to chal-
lenge the validity of suspect patents.
Privately initiated litigation has played an integral role in the enforce-
ment of a panoply of public rights, including antitrust, environmental rights,
free speech, and equal protection, to name just a few. Sometimes plaintiffs
sue as "private attorneys general," meaning they sue not only to enforce
their own private rights, but to vindicate the interests of the public at large.2"
At other times, public interest groups have been the driving force behind
large-scale public law adjudication. Groups like the NAACP and ACLU,
for example, have organized and financed litigation challenging racial seg-
regation,2' restrictions on free speech,22 and invasions of privacy.23 Public
Why Litigation Won 't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004).
17 See infra Part II.C (discussing how successful validity challenges create public goods from
which all of society benefits).
18 See generally Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforce-
ment, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2011) ("The IDEA requires that states provide 'appropriate'
educational services to children with disabilities, supplying some federal funding to help make this
possible. It creates a host of private enforcement mechanisms, from administrative hearings to lawsuits,
as well as a system of public enforcement through federal and state agencies.").
19 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 6, § 321, 125 Stat. 284, 306
(2011).
20 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 216 (1983).
21 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Inte-
gration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 473 (1976)
("By the early 1930's, the NAACP, with the support of a foundation grant, had organized a concerted
program of legal attacks on racial segregation .... [T]he campaign [was] a carefully planned one to
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interest groups play a particularly prominent role in public law cases where
an exclusively equitable remedy is sought, rather than monetary damages.
Together, private attorneys general and public interest organizations
supplement public law regimes in two vital ways. First, they act as watch-
dogs and deter wrongdoing.24 Second, they fill an enforcement gap created
by underfunded and understaffed government offices. 25 Indeed, lawmakers,
executive officers, and judges alike have recognized the benefit afforded by
privately initiated public law adjudication. 26 So, this invites the question
why private lawsuits are not being used to challenge potentially invalid
patents.
Under our current system, the only mechanism available to parties
wishing to challenge invalid patents in federal court is an action pursuant to
the Declaratory Judgment Act.27 While useful in many respects, declaratory
judgment actions exhibit certain limitations that discourage patent validity
contests. These disincentives include the lack of a financial reward for in-
validating patents and the risk of triggering countersuits for infringement.28
What is more, patent litigation is notoriously expensive, prolonged, and
unpredictable. 29 It is not too surprising, then, that patent declaratory judg-
ment actions are relatively rare."
Scholars have discussed this absence of incentives for authoritative
testing of patent validity and have suggested various solutions.3" While
secure decisions, rulings and public opinion on the broad principle instead of being devoted to merely
miscellaneous cases." (second alteration in original) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)).
22 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
24 See generally Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 529 (2011).
25 See 150 CONG. REC. S7566 (daily ed. July 6, 2004) ("[C]lass actions provide an important
'private attorney general' supplement to our efforts to obtain redress for violations of state consumer
protection, civil rights, labor, public health and environmental laws." (statement of thirteen states'
Attorneys General)).
26 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 246 F.R.D. 156, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The concept of a private attorney acting as a private attorney general is vital to the
continued enforcement and effectiveness of the Securities Acts."). But see Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming
the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 198 (2003) (arguing that recent Supreme Court
decisions undercut plaintiffs' abilities to bring private attorney general suits).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
28 See infra Part II.C (discussing the disincentives to affirmative validity challenges).
29 See infra Part II.C (discussing the high costs of patent litigation).
30 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (stating that only about 14 percent of the patent cases
filed annually were declaratory judgment actions).
31 Some scholars advocate litigation-stage fee shifting. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create
a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 795-97 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Igno-
rance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1530-31 (2001). Others support the imposition of a
bounty system and/or joint agreements among competitors of the patent owner to share the cost of a
validity challenge. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeat-
ing Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 704-05 (2004) [hereinafter Miller, Building a Better Bounty];
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finding a solution to this incentive problem is a high priority, it is not the
objective of this Article. This Article focuses instead on a different yet
equally weighty barrier to patent validity challenges in federal court: plain-
tiffs' frequent inability to satisfy the threshold requirements of standing and
personal jurisdiction under current Federal Circuit jurisprudence. Because
scholars have paid little attention to this phenomenon, I seek to fill that
space in the literature.
Despite the economic and pragmatic disincentives to affirmative pa-
tent challenges, parties still wish to pursue declaratory relief. Some of these
are private parties who want to clear any doubts as to whether their prod-
ucts infringe a valid patent, while others decide that the potential upside of
invalidating the patent is worth the risk and cost associated with litigation.
More recently, we have witnessed a surge in public interest group participa-
tion in the patent system. In the past few years, organizations like the
ACLU and Public Patent Foundation ("PUBPAT") have initiated large-
scale litigations pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act challenging the
validity of controversial patents relating to human genes in Ass 'n for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. PTO (Myriad),32 and genetically modified seed in Or-
ganic Seed Growers & Trade Ass 'n v. Monsanto Co.33 Yet, like many pri-
vate plaintiffs before them, these advocacy groups have discovered that the
Federal Circuit's patent declaratory judgment jurisprudence makes it very
difficult, if not impossible, to challenge invalid patents.
In patent declaratory judgment actions, plaintiffs must satisfy two "j u-
risdictional bedrocks" in order for the case to proceed on the merits: stand-
ing and personal jurisdiction.34 Article III of the Constitution provides that
federal courts may only hear actual "cases" or "controversies,"35 fiom
which courts have extrapolated the standing requirement,36 while the Due
Process Clause serves as the basis for the personal jurisdiction doctrine.37
Even though these threshold jurisdictional requirements emanate from dis-
tinct constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the Patent-Challenge-Bloc's
Antitrust Status, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 1 5 [hereinafter Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint
Venture?]; John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 340-42 (2001).
32 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); Megan M. La Belle, Standing to Sue in the Myriad Genetics
Case, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 68, 86 n.121 (2011).
33 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (challenging patents covering genetically modified seed).
PUBPAT is a nonprofit "legal services organization whose mission is to protect freedom in the patent
system." About PUBPAT, PUBLIC PATENT FOUNDATION, http://www.pubpat.org/About.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2012).
34 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999).
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009).
37 See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945).
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both ought to be assessed according to flexible, totality-of-the-
circumstances standards.38 Yet, in deciding questions of standing and per-
sonal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has trended instead toward formalistic
rules and "litigant centricity," meaning the court focuses its inquiries exclu-
sively on the particular parties in the case.39 This myopic approach to stand-
ing and personal jurisdiction, which I argue is rooted in private law theory,
often leads the Federal Circuit to dismiss patent declaratory judgment ac-
tions before plaintiffs have a chance to argue the merits of the case.
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that patent validity
disputes are private law litigation and argues that they are more properly
treated as public law litigation. The Article aims to show that the Federal
Circuit's erroneous view of validity challenges as private law adjudication
has created a flawed doctrinal architecture for patent declaratory judgment
actions that elevates the rights of private parties above those of the public.
Specifically, the court's private law approach to standing and personal ju-
risdiction has created significant procedural obstacles that preclude many
suits from being filed in the first place and often lead to the early dismissal
of those declaratory judgment actions that do get filed.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explores the dichotomy be-
tween public and private law and demonstrates that patent validity chal-
lenges are better characterized as public law. Viewing patent adjudication
through the lens of the public law model, Part II surveys the enforcement
mechanisms available for challenging patent validity, focusing on the De-
claratory Judgment Act. After sketching a brief history of the Act, this Part
then explains why privately initiated litigation to challenge suspect patents
is essential to a well-functioning patent system, and expounds on why our
current system is deficient.4"
Part III turns to the present state of Federal Circuit jurisprudence re-
garding patent declaratory relief and begins by discussing the court's ap-
proach to standing. It next addresses personal jurisdiction and demonstrates
that the court is using an overly formalistic framework to assess the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum state. With respect to both standing and per-
sonal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit's doctrine tends to impede rather than
facilitate declaratory judgment actions, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's clear and consistent message that these suits should be facilitated
because of the social welfare benefit of invalidating bad patents.
Part IV then argues that these unsound rules on standing and personal
jurisdiction flow from the Federal Circuit's inherently inaccurate view of
38 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
'9 See infra Part IV.A.2.
40 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 345-46 (1971) (discuss-
ing a line of Supreme Court cases that "eliminate[d] obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the
validity of a patent"); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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patent validity challenges as private, rather than public, law adjudication.
This doctrine is clearly intended to help patent owners predict if, when, and
where they might be sued for declaratory relief; it pays little regard to the
public good.4 From a normative perspective, this private law, litigant-
centric approach is untenable because the primary beneficiary of the patent
system is supposed to be the public, not the individual plaintiff and defend-
ant before the court. This Part concludes by proposing that the Federal Cir-
cuit evaluate standing and personal jurisdiction from a public law perspec-
tive, which comports with the Supreme Court's mandate to consider these
jurisdictional issues holistically rather than in accordance with narrowly
tailored rules.
Finally, Part V urges prompt action. The Supreme Court, Congress,
and the President have all acknowledged the impact poor quality patents
have on society at large. The Court has held that patent validity challenges
should be encouraged and facilitated to promote the public good, 42 and the
recently enacted AIA significantly expands the opportunities for the public
to participate in the patent system.43 Yet, even the major reform efforts of
the AlA will not provide the robust privately initiated federal court litiga-
tion that the patent system needs to eradicate bad patents. This Article con-
cludes that, to fill that void, the Federal Circuit must shift its view and
treatment of patent validity challenges to a public law paradigm, as many
other stakeholders in the patent system have already done.
I. PATENTS AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
A. The Private-Public Law Dichotomy
Traditionally, the role of civil litigation in the American legal system
was to provide a means for resolving disputes between private parties when
an out-of-court settlement could not be reached.' This classical model, now
referred to as private law litigation, included breach of contract cases, tort
actions, and disputes over real property. One important function of private
law litigation was to redress violations of specific individuals' rights, name-
ly the parties before the court.45 Another was to clarify the law so that future
private actors could predict the effect of their conduct and plan according-
41 See infra Part IV (discussing the flaws of the Federal Circuit's private law approach in patent
declaratory judgment actions).
42 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 345-46; Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
43 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 8, 125 Stat. 284, 306
(2011).
44 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1285.
45 See id ("[Tihe courts could be seen as an adjunct to private ordering, whose primary function
was the resolution of disputes about the fair implications of individual interactions.").
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ly.4 Private law adjudication was bipolar and retrospective. It was a contest
between "diametrically opposed" parties who disagreed about "an identified
set of completed facts."47 Moreover, the litigation was "party-initiated" and
"party-controlled."48 Judges were supposed to be passive and disengaged in
order to ensure fairness and impartiality.49
The 1950s marked the beginning of a sea change in our civil adjudica-
tory system. Alongside traditional private law litigation, a new form of ad-
judication emerged-public law (or public impact) litigation." Public law,
as originally conceived, was "the body of law dealing with the relations
between private individuals and the government, and with the structure and
operation of the government itself."'5 In that vein, early public law litigation
was comprised of structural challenges to public institutions like segregated
schools, overcrowded prisons, and mental health facilities. 2 Such efforts
were spearheaded by public interest organizations like the NAACP and
ACLU, and as a remedy they sought systemic, ongoing injunctive relief.
With time, though, the profile of public law adjudication expanded.
Coincident with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act was the rise of pri-
vate attorney general suits. 3 Private attorneys general are citizens who sue
not only to obtain direct individual relief, but also to vindicate important
public interests and deter wrongdoing. 4 These plaintiffs serve as class rep-
resentatives, filing suits collectively that likely would not be filed individu-
ally.55 In some contexts, like civil rights and antitrust, Congress has incen-
tivized these suits by granting successful plaintiffs the chance to recover
46 id.
47 Id. at 1282.
48 Id. at 1283.
49 Id. at 1286; Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982).
50 See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study ofAmici Curiae in Federal Court:
A Fine Balance ofAccess, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 679 (2008).
51 BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1350-51 (9th ed. 2009).
52 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284; Marcus, supra note 1, at 342; see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) ("Structural reform is premised on the notion that
the quality of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of large-scale organizations,
not just by individuals acting either beyond or within these organizations.").
53 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) (stating that
when a plaintiff brings a civil rights action he acts as a "'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority"); see also Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay
Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class
Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 353-54 (1988) ("Whether the private attorney general is
heralded as the 'Lone Ranger' or a 'bounty hunter,' both roles equally comport with cherished images of
Americana.").
54 Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MiNN. L. REV. 434, 441-42
(2007).
55 Coffee, supra note 20, at 216.
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large damage awards and reasonable attorney's fees.56 Private attorney gen-
eral suits are often directed at nongovernmental entities and policies. Yet,
these private party disputes are akin to structural reform litigation against
the government because they both "implicate serious political and sociolog-
ical issues ... [a]nd ... affect larger communities than those encompassed
by the litigants before the court.""7
Whether instigated by private citizens or public interest organizations,
public law adjudication is marked by certain characteristics. In his seminal
article, Professor Chayes explains that the subject matter of public law liti-
gation is not a dispute between private parties, but a complaint about the
policies or conduct of a governmental or nongovernmental entity. 8 Com-
plex party structures and requests for prospective remedial relief further
characterize these types of suits. 9 And unlike private law adjudication
where only the parties feel the immediate impact of the suit, public law
litigation instantly affects individuals not before the court.6" Finally, public
law adjudication is typified by active judges who decide substantive matters
and are responsible for the overall management of the suit.6' This active
judicial role is a stark contrast from the "passive umpireship" practiced by
judges in traditional private law litigation.62
Today, public law adjudication runs the gamut from structural chal-
lenges concerning overcrowded prisons in California,63 to toxic tort litiga-
tion against private companies. 6' In between are suits challenging employ-
ment discrimination, securities fraud, antitrust violations, and environmen-
tal harms. While different in many respects, all of these adjudicatory efforts
implicate important public interests, have far-reaching effects beyond the
parties, and frequently involve forward-looking relief. Since patent validity
challenges share many of these same characteristics, they too fit within the
public law litigation paradigm.
56 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k) (2006) (civil rights act requiring losing party to pay reasonable plaintiff's attorney's fees).
57 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 41 (1995).
58 Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5
(1982).
59 Id.
60 Id.; Chayes, supra note 1, at 1287.
61 Chayes, supra note 58, at 5.
62 Id. at 4.
63 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (mandating that California release or relocate tens
of thousands of prisoners within two years because its overcrowded, unsanitary prisons violated the
Eighth Amendment).
64 See generally David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 IARv. L. REV. 849 (1984).
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B. Patent Validity Challenges as Public Law Adjudication
The patent system in the United States, much like other intellectual
property regimes, aims to balance certain public and private rights. An in-
ventor who introduces a new technology is granted a limited exclusive right
to use that invention.65 In exchange, society enjoys the benefit of a new,
useful, and fully disclosed technology that will be donated to the public
once the patent expires.66 A patent, therefore, represents a compromise of
the public's right to access new technologies and the private rights of inno-
vators.
Yet, any benefit that patents confer on individuals is secondary to the
public's interest in our patent system. The primary normative goal of the
patent system, as contemplated by the Constitution itself, is to benefit the
public by "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts."67 Courts
have held that patents are granted to encourage useful, socially valuable
innovation, not to reward the innovators.68 "The patent law is directed to the
public purposes of fostering technological progress, investment in research
and development, capital formation, entrepreneurship, innovation, national
strength, and international competitiveness."69 Simply put, patents are a
means to an end.7° And it is that end-the promotion of innovation for the
public good-that is paramount.7
Historically, though, patent litigation has been regarded as private law
litigation. Patent litigation has been compared to property, contract, and tort
litigation, all of which fall within the realm of private law litigation. The
Supreme Court, for example, has held that "[a] patent for an invention is as
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective... Discoveries").
66 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEw TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 29 (5th ed. 2010).
67 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
626 (2008) ("'[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the
owners of patents but is 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts. "' (quoting Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917))).
68 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) ("[T]he promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts is the 'main object'; reward of inventors is secondary and merely a means to
that end."); cf Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary objective
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' (alteration in original)).
69 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (New-
man, J., concurring), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
70 Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278.
71 Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 511; see also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224,
234 (1892) ("It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless
patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.").
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much property as a patent for land. ' 2 Other courts have treated patents as
contracts between the inventor and the government.73 The Federal Circuit,
meanwhile, approaches patents from a tort law perspective.74 Scholars have
criticized these private law analogies for different reasons.75 Yet, in at least
one way, these private law analogies are similarly flawed-they all focus
exclusively on patent infringement. The fallacy of drawing analogies based
on infringement is that it does not reflect the realities of modem patent liti-
gation.
Patent infringement claims arguably map onto a private law model
since they consist of one private party's alleged violation of another private
party's rights.76 Even that analogy is not perfect, however. As Professor Ted
Sichelman has argued:
Unlike typical private law rights, patent law-from its origin in this country-has intention-
ally used its rights and remedies as a mechanism to encourage optimal social levels of inno-
vation. In a sense, the patent holder is merely a private attorney general, paid via the en-
forcement of his right as a reward for benefitting the public.
77
Patent infringement claims, in other words, exhibit attributes of both private
and public law and cannot easily be categorized as one or the other.
72 Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876); see also Kenneth W. Dam, The Eco-
nomic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 268 (1994) ("One can read nineteenth-
century patent cases ... with the sense that the courts were dealing with a subject akin to private law,
recognizing perhaps that patents were property rights."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is
Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 109 (1990) ("Patents give a right to exclude, just as the
law of trespass does with real property.").
73 See Fried. Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594 (3d Cir. 1911)
("lA]n American patent is a written contract between an inventor and the government."); Davis Airfoils,
Inc. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 350, 352 (Ct. Cl. 1954) ("A patent is a contract between the inventor
and the public, the terms of which are formulated by the United States Patent Office.").
74 See In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Patent infringe-
ment is properly classified as a tort, albeit one created by federal statute."); Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. ITC,
721 F.2d 1305, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (treating patent infringement as a continuing tort).
75 See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor
After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1318-19 (2004) (criticizing social contract theory as ap-
plied to patent law); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (2005) (arguing against the notion that intellectual property is analogous to real property);
Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of "'Private Law" Remedies 8 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No.
11-077, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1932834 (questioning the use of tort law concepts
in patent law). But see Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 127, 130 (2000) (advancing a private law theory of the patent system).
76 In re Qimonda AG, 425 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that patent infringement
actions were nothing more than private claims to protect private rights), rev'd sub nom. ITC v. Jaffe,
433 B.R. 538 (E.D. Va. 2010); David M. Scilitz & Richard J. McGrath, Patent Infringement Claims
Against the United States Government, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 351, 351-53 (2000). But see infra Part IV (dis-
cussing public law attributes of infringement claims).
77 Sichelman, supra note 75, at 11 (footnote omitted).
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But infringement tells only half the story of modem patent litigation.
Today, most patent suits are comprised not only of infringement allega-
tions, but of validity claims as well. In most cases, the patent owner sues for
infringement, and the defendant responds with counterclaims asking the
court to declare the patent invalid.78 The less common scenario-but the
one that is the focus of this Article-involves an affirmative patent validity
challenge, meaning the declaratory judgment claims are asserted against the
patent owner first. However the litigation is structured, the upshot is that
issues of patent validity are of central importance to modem patent adjudi-
cation. In fact, in cases like Myriad and Monsanto, patent validity is the
only issue in dispute.79
Unlike patent infringement, patent validity disputes bear little resem-
blance to private law litigation. The issue whether a patent is valid has noth-
ing to do with private rights. Instead, the question in such suits is: Did the
PTO, a governmental agency, make a mistake when it issued the patent?8"
The answer to this question does not depend on the conduct of the patent
owner or the alleged infringer, but rather is an objective inquiry into wheth-
er the patentability requirements were actually satisfied as the PTO con-
cluded.8 And the answer to this question-whether the invention is patent-
able-lies at the heart of our patent system.82 Valid patents give the public
something it did not have before, namely a new and useful technology.83
With an invalid patent, on the other hand, the inventbr gains exclusivity
while society gets nothing in return because the invention was already part
of the public domain.84 So invalid patents violate the quid pro quo patenta-
bility principle set forth in the Constitution and threaten our patent system
at its core. In short, the subject matter of patent validity disputes, in con-
tradistinction to patent infringement, is distinctly public in nature.
78 See generally Dolak, supra note 8, at 410.
79 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1344 (Fed. Cir, 2011), vacated sub
nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
80 See infra Part 11 (setting out requirements for patentability).
81 Cf MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 66, at 130 (describing five requirements of pa-
tentability).
82 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979) (noting the "strong federal policy
that only inventions which meet the rigorous requirements of patentability shall be withdrawn from the
public domain").
83 Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
84 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (explaining that inventions covered by invalid
patents "are in reality a part of the public domain"); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on
the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1162 (2000) ("[A]n author or inventor may not be given something for nothing;
the author or the inventor must give the public something it did not have before to earn a grant of exclu-
sive rights from Congress.").
85 Cf Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 US. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) ("If the public were already in posses-
sion and common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for presum-
ing, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which
[VOL. 20:1
PATENT LAW AS PUBLIC LAW
Besides subject matter, patent validity disputes exhibit many other
"public law" characteristics. For starters, patent validity disputes are reme-
dially prospective, unlike private law adjudication.86 Looking at Myriad as
an example, the ACLU does not seek monetary damages on behalf of its
clients to compensate for past injuries, but instead requests prospective re-
lief in the form of a declaration of patent invalidity. 7 To be sure, this inabil-
ity to recover damages is one reason why patent validity challenges are so
rare.
88
Patent validity disputes, moreover, are multipartied and far-reaching.
Some cases, like Myriad, involve complex party structures. There are twen-
ty named plaintiffs in Myriad-including various medical organizations,
genetics researchers, clinicians, and cancer patients-and several defend-
ants, including the patent owner and the PTO.89 Yet, even validity challeng-
es involving only a single plaintiff and a single defendant are not bipolar. In
sharp contrast to private law litigation where the court's intervention is con-
fined to the parties before it,9" the impact of patent validity disputes is felt
far beyond the four walls of the courtroom. This is because of the Supreme
Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois
Foundation.9
The question in Blonder-Tongue was whether a declaration of patent
invalidity in one lawsuit should preclude a patent owner from relitigating
the issue in a subsequent proceeding.92 The Court held that declarations of
invalidity should be granted preclusive effect.93 The Court hoped that adopt-
ing this standard would "encourage [the] authoritative testing of patent va-
lidity" and protect the public's interest in "'seeing that patent monopolies
... are kept within their legitimate scope."'94 In the wake of Blonder-
Tongue, the result of a successful validity challenge is that the previously
protected intellectual property enters the public domain and creates a public
good.95 Competitors of the patent owner and consumers of the patented
was already common. There would be no quid pro quo--no price for the exclusive right or monopoly
conferred upon the inventor for fourteen years.").
86 See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282.
87 See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing the Myriad case).
88 See infra Part II.C (addressing the various disincentives for patent validity challenges).
89 Complaint Jill 7-26, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 1:09-cv-04515-RWS), affid in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated
sub non. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
90 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282-83.
91 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
92 Id. at 317.
93 Id. at 349-50
94 Id. at 343-44 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945)).
95 See id. at 349-50 (holding that once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel pre-
vents the patent owner from ever asserting it again); Farrell & Merges, supra note 16, at 952.
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product-parties who were not participants in the litigation-benefit just
like the party who successfully challenged the patent.96 Thus, patent validity
challenges not only implicate important public interests, but they also have
the potential to affect many parties not before the court.
Finally, judges often play an active role in modern patent litigation. In
cases where only patent validity (and not infringement) is in dispute, the
claim is considered equitable and the court itself will decide whether the
patent is valid.97 And even when a jury decides disputed factual questions,
the ultimate conclusion of patent validity remains a legal one reserved for
the court.98 In addition to deciding substantive issues, judges today actively
manage patent cases rather than passively umpire them.99 Many federal
courts have adopted specialized local rules that "provide a standard struc-
ture for patent cases that... permit greater predictability and planning for
the Court and the litigants."'" These rules govern, among other things, the
timing for discovery requests, the process for infringement and invalidity
contentions, and motions to stay pending reexamination of the patents in
suit. °  Some of these courts take it one step further by actively encouraging
the filing of patent cases,0 2 acting as willing arbiters of discovery dis-
putes,"°3 and playing an otherwise integral role in the resolution of patent
cases.14
All in all, patent validity disputes-much like securities, antitrust, en-
vironmental, and mass tort cases-fit within Professor Chayes's paradigm
of public law litigation.0 5 In order for a public law regime to succeed, how-
96 See infra Part 11.B (discussing how successful validity challenges create public goods from
which all of society benefits).
97 See In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Medimmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
98 See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("[T]he ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a question of law for the court to decide.").
99 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284.
100 N.D. ILL. PATENT L.R. PREAMBLE, available at http://www.ilnd.uscourtsgov/home/_assets/
documents/Rules/localpatentrules-preamble.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
101 Id.
102 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia's "Renegade Jurisdiction ": Lessons for Patent Law Reform,
83 TUL. L. REV. 11I, 136 (2008) (explaining that judges in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas "enjoy presiding over patent cases and encourage patent cases to be filed in their divi-
sions").
103 Id. at 137 (stating that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas "provide[s] a
hotline number for lawyers to contact a judge who is on call during business hours to rule on discovery
disputes").
104 T.S. Ellis, Ill, Judicial Management of Patent Litigation in the United States: Expedited Proce-
dures and Their Effects, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 541, 542-43 (2000) ("First, and absolutely vital, is the early
setting of a fixed and immutable trial date.").
105 See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 238 n.128 (2000) (arguing that environmental cases fit within Chayes's paradigm);
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 472 (1994)
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ever, there must be an array of enforcement mechanisms in place. The next
Part of this Article surveys the enforcement mechanisms available for chal-
lenging invalid patents and demonstrates why our current system is defi-
cient.
II. PATENT VALIDITY CHALLENGES
The normative goal of the patent system is to promote innovation,"°
and Congress has established conditions of patentability in furtherance of
this goal."°7 Specifically, Congress has determined that an invention is pa-
tentable if it is: (i) appropriate subject matter; (ii) useful; (iii) novel; (iv)
nonobvious; and (v) sufficiently disclosed and described so that others will
be able to make and use the invention." 8 It is then up to the PTO to examine
patent applications to ensure that inventions satisfy each of these require-
ments."° But what happens when patent examiners make mistakes and issue
bad patents?
Bad patents create a myriad of problems."' First and foremost, bad pa-
tents undermine the patent quid pro quo and jeopardize the innovation ob-
jective of the patent system."' Moreover, when bad patents are asserted in
litigation, the target company often has to divert funds from its ordinary
business or from research and development, which may lead to increased
consumer prices and decreased consumer choices." 2 Even if unenforced,
bad patents may have a chilling effect on the marketplace by dissuading or
delaying competitors' entry into the market." 3 Finally, the existence of bad
("Mass tort cases are akin to public litigations involving court-ordered restructuring of institutions to
protect constitutional rights.").
106 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
107 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2006).
108 MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 66, at 29.
109 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112.
110 Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 43, 49-53 (2010); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About
Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005, at 10, 12.
111 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) ("If the public were already in possession
and common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming,
that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was
already common. There would be no quid pro quo-no price for the exclusive right or monopoly con-
ferred upon the inventor for fourteen years.").
112 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/
innovationrpt.pdf, Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592 (1999)
(discussing the social costs of invalid patents).
113 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents,
91 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2006).
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patents calls into question the legitimacy of all patents, including valid,
well-deserved patents."'
So, when the PTO makes mistakes and grants poor quality patents,
there must be a way to remedy those errors." 5 Under our current system,
federal court adjudication is the primary gatekeeper of patent quality."6
This Article raises questions concerning the feasibility of validity challeng-
es in federal court, particularly those affirmative suits brought pursuant to
the Declaratory Judgment Act. Yet, before turning this discussion to the
courts, this Part briefly outlines alternative mechanisms for policing bad
patents at the PTO.
A. Challenging Patent Validity at the PTO
For most of the twentieth century, the PTO played a limited role vis-a-
vis validity determinations: the agency reviewed patents ex ante to ensure
compliance with the patentability criteria established by Congress. Once the
PTO issued the patent, the agency's job was done and any disputes regard-
ing validity were to be resolved in federal court."7 In the early 1980s, how-
ever, this began to change as Congress incrementally expanded the PTO's
jurisdiction over various proceedings for challenging patents." 8
The first of these administrative vehicles was ex parte reexamination,
which permitted either the patent owner or a third party to ask the PTO to
take a second look at an already-issued patent.' 9 Because Congress intend-
ed ex parte reexamination to provide a quick and inexpensive way to chal-
lenge patent validity, the scope of the proceedings was quite narrow. 2°
Most significantly, a third party who requested reexamination was not per-
114 Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the
Patent Office, 40 HOuS. L. REV. 1219, 1228 (2004) (acknowledging "the diminution in public confi-
dence about the integrity of an administrative system that issues bad patents").
115 See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1198-1203 (2012) (arguing that ex post private enforcement is some-
times necessary to fill ex ante regulatory gaps).
116 Farrell & Merges, supra note 16, at 946-47, 960, 964 (acknowledging that litigation is the
primary mechanism for eradicating bad patents and proposing new administrative review procedures to
assist in the effort); Lemley, supra note 31, at 1510-11 ("[S]ociety ought to resign itself to the fact that
bad patents will issue, and attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in litiga-
tion.").
117 During this time, patentees could file an application for reissue of a patent to correct at least one
error in the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). So in those limited circumstances, the PTO would partici-
pate in a post-grant review of the patent.
118 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION 1-2 (2004) (hereinafter "INTER PARTES REPORT"), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexamreport.pdf.
119 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015.
120 INTER PARTES REPORT, supra note 118, at 1-2.
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mitted to participate in the proceeding. 2' Ex parte reexamination, moreover,
was limited to a few validity defenses based only on certain types of prior
art.122 As a result of these restrictions, third parties rarely availed themselves
of ex parte reexamination.'
2
1
Over the next two decades, the federal judiciary's patent docket steadi-
ly grew and the costs of litigation continued to rise. Congress again at-
tempted to alleviate this problem by creating administrative avenues for
patent validity challenges.' 24 Congress enacted the American Inventors Pro-
tection Act ("AIPA") in 1999, and created a new post-grant review pro-
ceeding as part of that legislation. 25 This proceeding, designated as inter
partes reexamination, 26 allowed for greater participation by third-party pa-
tent challengers. For example, third-party challengers could comment on
the patent owner's responses to PTO office actions and could appeal the
PTO's ultimate validity decision to the Federal Circuit.' 27 Yet, in spite of
these additional safeguards, third parties' reliance on inter partes reexami-
nation remained sporadic because of other shortcomings in the proceedings.
Those shortcomings included the lack of provisions for discovery or cross-
examination since the PTO's examining corps, not administrative judges,
conducted the reexamination; the inability to challenge patents issued be-
fore 1999; the narrow scope of validity defenses that could be raised; and,
perhaps most importantly, the preclusive effect of the reexamination deter-
mination in subsequent patent litigation.'28
In more recent years, the use of inter partes reexamination, or reexam,
has picked up quite a bit, with more than 900 of these proceedings initiated
since 2009.129 While inter partes reexam costs substantially less than litiga-
tion, the process is extremely slow, taking more than three years to com-
plete.'30 Thus, Congress continued to believe that further change was need-
ed. And so in fall 2011, after years of failed legislative efforts to reform the
patent system, Congress passed the America Invents Act, which President
121 Id. at 2.
122 Id. at 3.
123 Id. at 3-4.
124 See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 1501A-
552.
125 Id. sec. 4601.
126 id.
127 Although Congress did not provide the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit in the initial legis-
lation, it amended the AIPA in 2002 to provide this and other rights in hopes of promoting greater use of
the inter partes reexamination proceeding. See INTER PARTES REPORT, supra note 118, at 2-3.
128 Id. at 6-8.
129 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (2011),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/IP_quarterly report September 2011 .pdf.
130 Jason Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge & Jay Kesan, Debate, America Invents, More or Less?, 160
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 248-49 (2012).
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Obama signed into law on September 16, 2011.'' The AIA addresses wide-
ranging subject matter, from a new first-to-file system to specialized joinder
rules for patent infringement litigation. But a primary feature of the re-
formed system is an enhanced post-grant review proceeding for challenging
patent validity.
32
This new post-grant review proceeding, which will be effective begin-
ning in September 2012, differs from its predecessors in many respects.
One major distinction is that a panel of PTO judges, rather than the examin-
ing corps, will conduct the initial review of the patent.'33 There will also be
a broader range of defenses available to a third-party challenger in post-
grant review than in inter partes reexam' 34 A third party, for instance, will
be able to contest a patent for lack of adequate written description or im-
proper subject matter, and may raise prior art other than patents and printed
publications in challenging the patent on anticipation or obviousness
grounds.'35 Moreover, the parties involved in post-grant review will be af-
forded certain procedural protections, including the right to conduct discov-
ery and to request an oral hearing, which was not a feature of reexamina-
tion.'36 Finally, if either party is dissatisfied with the PTO's post-grant re-
view decision, a direct appeal to the Federal Circuit may be taken."'
Only time will tell whether these new administrative procedures will
achieve their intended purpose-to provide third parties with a transparent,
timely, and cost-effective alternative to litigation for challenging patents.'38
What is sure, though, is that post-grant review will not wholly supplant
validity contests in federal court because the petition must be filed within
nine months of the patent grant.'39 That means that a significant body of
131 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
132 Id. sec. 6, § 321, 125 Stat. at 305-06. Although the AIA retains inter partes reexamination, it has
been relabeled "inter partes review" and modified in several respects. id. sec. 6, § 311, 125 Stat. at 299.
This Article focuses on post-grant review because it represents a major change to our current system and
has far greater potential to significantly impact patent litigation in federal court.
133 Id. sec. 7, § 6, 125 Stat. at 313 (establishing a Patent Trial and Appeal Board and indicating that
one of its duties will be to conduct post-grant reviews).
134 Changes to Implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7060, 7061 (proposed
Feb. 10, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) ("More grounds for seeking post-grant review will be
available as compared with inter parties review.").
135 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6, § 321, 125 Stat. at 306 ("A petitioner in a post-grant
review may request to cancel as unpatentable I or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be
raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).").
136 Id. sec. 6, § 326, 125 Stat. at 308-09; Changes to Implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings,
77 Fed. Reg. at 7066-67.
137 This ability to appeal the PTO's post-grant review decision in federal court potentially raises
interesting questions about standing. See infra note 494 and accompanying text.
138 Changes to implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. at 7060.
139 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6, § 321(c), 125 Stat. at 306. Critics believe that post-
grant review will have limited impact for other reasons as well. For example, some believe parties will
decline to adjudicate validity at the PTO because of the preclusive effects such administrative decisions
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already-issued patents is exempt from these administrative proceedings; so
if those patents are to be affirmatively tested, it will have to be in federal
court pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act."4
B. The Declaratory Judgment Act
The Declaratory Judgment Act, enacted in 1934, provides that "[i]n a
case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction... any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration."''
The Act further explains that "[a]ny such declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."' 42
Congress actively considered legislation for fifteen years before the
Declaratory Judgment Act passed, so the legislative history is quite compli-
cated. 43 Some things are relatively clear, however. For one, Congress be-
lieved that the declaratory judgment procedure would provide a "valuable
and effective aid in the administration of justice."'" Moreover, the Declara-
tory Judgment Act was supposed to allow for the resolution of genuine dis-
putes without the need for a formal violation of rights.'45 The idea was to
allow for anticipatory, or preventive, adjudication. 46 Permitting claims be-
will have in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 481
n.49 (2011). Others claim that the nine-month window is too short because parties often do not learn of
adverse patents until they are sued in federal court many years after the patent was issued. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents Act,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 103, 122-24 (2011).
140 It is true that these already-issued patents could be challenged under the AIA's inter partes
review proceeding. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6, 125 Stat. at 299. However, because of the
inherent limitations of inter partes review-such as the inability to raise certain validity defenses-
parties will likely continue to turn to the courts for relief.
141 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
142 id.
143 See Donald L. Doemberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory
Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court
Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 550-51 (1989).
144 S. REP. No. 73-1005, at 1 (1934).
145 Id. (stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act "enables parties in disputes over their rights over
a contract, deed, lease, will, or any other written instrument to sue for a declaration of rights, without
breach of the contract, etc., citing as defendants those who oppose their claims of right").
146 See Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275, 1276 (2010) ("Preven-
tive adjudication is intuitively appealing-it helps people avoid harm and provides clarity in the law.");
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 684 (1994) ("Declaratory judgments often resolve questions involving legal rights or duties
before a party has taken any action that might violate anyone's legal rights.").
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fore any injury occurred, so the theory goes, will advance the underlying
objective of avoiding economic waste and promoting the public good.'47
Since the Declaratory Judgment Act became law, the Supreme Court
has had several occasions to interpret it. Early on the Court had to decide
whether the Act created any new substantive rights, or whether it is a purely
procedural device providing nothing more than a new remedy for already-
existing rights. 4 ' The Court held, and has repeatedly confirmed, that "the
Declaratory Judgment Act is 'procedural only."" 49 Being procedural in na-
ture, the Act is transsubstantive and therefore available in all types of feder-
al litigation regardless of the subject matter of the underlying claims. 5° In-
deed, plaintiffs have invoked the Declaratory Judgment Act in a wide range
of civil suits over the years, including cases involving First Amendment
claims,'5 ' contractual disputes,'52 and antitrust matters,'53 to name just a few.
Yet, from the beginning, the Declaratory Judgment Act and patents
have been closely linked. The Act's legislative history indicates that Con-
gress was particularly concerned with alleged patent infringers who faced
the threat of suit, but could not ask a court to determine their rights.'54 Pro-
fessor Edson R. Sunderland, a proponent of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
testified before Congress about the plight of alleged patent infringers:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim that you have a patent. What am
I going to do about it? There is no way I can litigate my right, which I claim, to use that de-
vice, except by going ahead and using it, and you [the patent holder] can sit back as long as
you please and let me run up just as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up,
and then you may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good
147 S. REP. No. 73-1005, at 2 (explaining that the declaratory judgment procedure "has been espe-
cially useful in avoiding the necessity ... of having to act at one's peril or to act on one's own interpre-
tation of his rights, or abandon one's rights because of a fear of incurring damages").
148 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
149 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950) (quoting Aetna Life, 300
U.S. at 240); see also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1959) (stating that the
Declaratory Judgment Act "leav[es] substantive rights unchanged"). Scholars have challenged this
conclusion, however, arguing that Congress intended the Act to create substantive rights. Doernberg &
Mushlin, supra note 143, at 532-33.
150 See H.R. REP. No. 70-366, at 2 (1928) (explaining that the Declaratory Judgment Act can be
employed, among other things, to declare the legality of marriage, construe written instruments, and
determine the validity of statutes); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:
An Essay on Adjusting the "One Size Fits All" Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2010) (de-
fining transsubstantivity as "the notion that the same procedural rules should be available for all civil
law suits.., regardless of the substantive law underlying the claims").
151 See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
152 See, e.g., North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 474 U.S. 931 (1985).
153 See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 500.
154 See Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 70th Cong. 35 (1928).
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faith and on my best judgment, but having no way in the world to find out whether I had a
right to use that device or not.155
This scenario has been described alternatively as a patent owner's use of a
"scarecrow" patent, 56 or "a patent owner['s] engage[ment] in a danse ma-
cabre, brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword."'57 Either
way, the patent owner's threats can have a chilling effect on competition.
Since its enactment, the Declaratory Judgment Act has played an im-
portant role in protecting alleged infringers from this danse macabre. An
accused infringer who is threatened with a patent of questionable validity
has the power to challenge the patent in federal court seeking a declaration
of invalidity.' 8 If the court agrees and declares the patent invalid, then the
challenger is free to use the previously protected invention without worry-
ing about future infringement suits.
Not only do patent declaratory judgment actions protect alleged in-
fringers, but they also serve two vital social welfare functions that are
sometimes overlooked. First, these suits assist in the effort to eradicate bad
patents and ameliorate the far-reaching, negative implications bad patents
have on our market system. Second, successful patent declaratory judgment
actions create public goods. When a patent is declared invalid in federal
court, the patent is rendered void as to the entire world and the previously
protected intellectual property enters the public domain.'59 The result is the
creation of a public good enjoyed by society as a whole, not just the party
who challenged the patent. 60
In this way, declaratory judgment actions are vital to a well-balanced
and well-functioning patent system. Just as in other public law regimes, like
securities and antitrust, privately initiated litigation serves as an essential
tool in the enforcement of patent rights. 6 ' To be sure, the Supreme Court
155 Id.
156 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1993).
157 Id.; see also David I. Levine & Charles E. Belle, Declaratory Relief After MedImmune, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 491, 493 (2010) ('l]f a patent owner is aware of a potential infringer, the
patent owner can wait to bring a suit of infringement while the monetary damages increase, but the
(increasingly liable) potential infringer would have no recourse to rectify the situation.").
158 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); Dolak, Power or Prudence, supra note 8, at 410-11 ("[A] patent
challenger may, in appropriate circumstances, institute patent litigation in federal court by filing a com-
plaint requesting a declaration of patent invalidity, unenforceability, or noninfringement." (footnotes
omitted)).
159 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I11. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that
once a patent is invalidated, nonmutual collateral estoppel prevents the patent owner from ever asserting
it again); Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture?, supra note 31, 1 ("A patent challenger
who defeats a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors.").
160 While beneficial to the public, this phenomenon actually creates disincentives for challenging
invalid patents. See infra Part ll.C (discussing the "public good problem").
161 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1,61 n.13 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing the
important role private attorneys general play in the antitrust and securities arenas); S. REP. No. 104-98,
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has long acknowledged the value of affirmative patent validity challenges.
Because invalid patents have such a weighty impact on competition, con-
sumers, and the patent system as a whole, the ability to challenge such pa-
tents is crucial to the public interest.'62 Thus, the Court consistently has
adopted legal standards that encourage and facilitate lawsuits brought by
parties disposed to challenge the validity of a patent.'63
The earliest Supreme Court case in this jurisprudential line dates back
more than a century. In Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 64 the ques-
tion for the Court was whether to enforce a provision in a patent license
agreement that precluded the licensee from challenging the validity of the
underlying patent.'65 The Court denied injunctive relief and refused to en-
force the no-contest clause.'66 The Court reasoned that "[i]t is as important
to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents,
as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly."'67
Notwithstanding the decision in Pope, the common law doctrine of li-
censee estoppel emerged and eventually became the norm over the next
fifty or so years. Pursuant to this doctrine, courts precluded licensees from
bringing declaratory judgment actions to invalidate patents subject to a li-
cense agreement.'68 The Supreme Court reviewed this doctrine in Lear v.
Adkins,'69 and ultimately decided to eliminate it. 7° The Court reasoned that
"[1]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incen-
tive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery,"'' and so the
licensee estoppel doctrine threatened the public's interest in eliminating
at 8 (1995) ("The SEC enforcement program and the availability of private rights of action together
provide a means for defrauded investors to recover damages and a powerful deterrent against violations
of the securities laws."); Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV.
675, 675 (2010) (noting that "private enforcement of the antitrust laws vastly outstrips public enforce-
ment"); James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 115, 128 (2012) ("Private attorneys general incentivized by economic payoffs will find it
profitable to investigate and enforce the securities laws, enabling public enforcers to focus their re-
sources on other tasks.").
162 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (explaining the importance of validity challeng-
es in light of the "public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in
reality a part of the public domain").
163 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 345-46 (discussing line of Supreme Court cases that "elimi-
nate[d] obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity of a patent"); Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
'64 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
165 Id. at233.
166 Id. at 232, 237-38.
167 Id. at 234.
168 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664 (1969).
169 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
170 Id. at 670-71.
171 Id. at 670.
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specious patents.12 In the Court's view, the public's right to access the pub-
lic domain was paramount to the patent owner's private rights established
by the license agreement.
Only two years after Lear the Court again elevated public rights above
private rights in the patent context. In Blonder-Tongue, the question was
whether a declaration of patent invalidity in one lawsuit should preclude a
patent owner from relitigating the issue in a subsequent proceeding. 73 As
previously discussed, the Court held that declarations of invalidity should
be granted preclusive effect in order to encourage the "authoritative testing
of patent validity" and protect the public's interest in "seeing that patent
monopolies ... are kept within their legitimate scope."'74
And finally, in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc. , T
the Supreme Court considered the Federal Circuit's practice of routinely
vacating a district court's declaration of invalidity following a determina-
tion that the patent was not infringed.'76 The Court rejected the Federal Cir-
cuit's practice and held that it must decide validity even when the patent is
not infringed because of the social welfare objectives realized by successful
validity challenges.'77 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reminded the
Federal Circuit of "the importance to the public at large of resolving ques-
tions of patent validity,"'' 8 and suggested that "[m]erely the desire to avoid
the threat of a 'scarecrow' patent ... may therefore be sufficient to estab-
lish jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act."'79
For more than a century now, the Supreme Court has sent an unequiv-
ocal and monolithic message regarding patent validity contests in federal
court-these suits must be encouraged and facilitated because the cost of
bad patents is so high for society. Congress and the President echoed this
sentiment by enacting the AIA with its various provisions, including post-
grant review procedures, aimed at enhancing the availability of validity
challenges. 8 ° Unfortunately, though, significant pragmatic and legal barri-
ers remain that make it far too difficult-and sometimes even impossible-
for private parties to pursue patent declaratory judgment actions in federal
court.
172 Id. at 670-71 ("If [licensees] are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute
to would-be monopolists without need or justification.").
173 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 317 (1971).
174 Id. at 343-44.
175 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
176 Id. at 101.
177 Id. at 102-03.
178 Id. at 100.
179 Id. at 96.
180 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 6, § 311, 125 Stat. 284, 299
(2011).
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C. Challenging Patent Validity in Federal Court
Privately initiated litigation has played a critical role in the enforce-
ment of an array of public rights, including free speech, antitrust, securities,
environmental rights, and equal protection. In some instances these suits are
brought by private attorneys general, meaning plaintiffs who sue to enforce
their own rights as well as to vindicate the interests of similarly situated
members of the public.' 8' At other times public interest groups like the
NAACP, ACLU, and Natural Resources Defense Council have been the
driving force behind large-scale public law adjudication, particularly where
the remedy sought is purely equitable in nature.182 Unlike these other public
law regimes, however, the patent system historically has lacked robust pri-
vately initiated litigation to challenge the validity of suspect patents.
1 83
Why? Well, this phenomenon can be explained in part by a number of
pragmatic disincentives facing plaintiffs considering a patent declaratory
judgment action.
The first disincentive for plaintiffs wishing to challenge a patent in
federal court is the remedy. A party who successfully contests a patent is
awarded a declaration that the patent-in-suit is invalid. 1" A declaration of
invalidity undoubtedly benefits the plaintiff (as well as its competitors and
the public). Once the patent is invalidated, for example, competitors no
longer have to pay license fees or worry about infringement.'85 Moreover,
the previously protected invention enters the public domain, meaning com-
petitors are free to use that technology thereby eliminating expensive re-
search and development efforts.'86 Yet, plaintiffs who win validity chal-
lenges receive no additional monetary reward.' Contrast this with securi-
ties fraud and antitrust cases where the private attorney general plaintiffs
(and their lawyers) often recover significant damages.' This lack of finan-
181 Coffee, supra note 20, at 216 (defining private attorneys general).
182 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
183 See Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture?, supra note 31, 4 (discussing patent law
"doctrine's structural tilt against patent challenges"); Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of
Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 89 (2006) (discussing "[t]he absence of participatory mecha-
nisms that support third party constituencies in patent law").
184 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
185 See generally Sean M. O'Connor, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty
Payment Risks After MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 381, 445 (2007) (stating that once
a patent is invalidated "the licensee will not be obligated to pay anything else").
186 Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture?, supra note 31, 35.
187 Miller, Building a Better Bounty, supra note 31, at 668 ("A patent challenger who succeeds in
defeating a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors.").
188 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 168 (1 st Cir.
1983) (recognizing the ability to recover damages in antitrust and securities cases), affd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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cial incentives is a substantial barrier for many plaintiffs who might other-
wise consider pursuing declaratory relief.
A second and equally daunting impediment to validity suits is the very
real risk that the patent owner will countersue for infringement. Parties who
file patent declaratory judgment actions usually trigger infringement suits,
especially when the plaintiff is a competitor of the defendant patent own-
er."'89 The consequences of an infringement charge can be devastating, as the
remedies potentially include an injunction, treble damages, and even attor-
ney's fees in some cases. 9 ' Thus, at the end of the day, if the validity chal-
lenge fails and the patent owner prevails on infringement, the challenger
could end up much worse off than before the declaratory judgment action.
Third, the parties usually best positioned to contest bad patents-
competitors-often are loath to initiate challenges because of concerns
about putting their own intellectual property at risk. Competitors frequently
have patents on similar technology. 9' So if a competitor's patent is invali-
dated, say for lack of patentable subject matter, that finding could cast
doubt on the patentability of plaintiff's inventions in the same technological
field. "'92 This possible ripple effect acts as another deterrent to parties decid-
ing whether to contest the validity of a competitor's patent.
A fourth disincentive to affirmative validity challenges is what schol-
ars refer to as the "public good problem."' 93 When a patent is declared inva-
lid, the previously protected intellectual property is returned to the public
domain where anyone may use and enjoy it.194 While this is beneficial from
a social welfare perspective,' 9 it dissuades parties from contesting patents
because they bear all the costs and risks of litigation, but reap only part of
the benefit.'96 The public good problem impedes validity challenges because
it places the challenger at a competitive disadvantage compared to everyone
else in that technological field.' 97 The challenger alone pays the cost of in-
189 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1104-06.
190 See generally id. 1 119 ("Current doctrines on measuring damages from patent infringement can
result in awards that have a devastating impact on a company.").
191 See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 623-24 (2005) ("If
core patents are distributed roughly evenly among firms participating in a market . .. those firms will
have a strong incentive to enter into cross-licenses, since their interests are symmetrical: they need their
competitors' patents just as much as the competitors need their patents.").
192 Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707,
726 (2004) ("[P]atent litigation ... often involves similarly situated competitors, neither of which may
be interested in raising an issue with implications beyond the patent in suit.").
193 See Carrier, supra note 139, at 111; Farrell & Merges, supra note 16, at 958; Miller, Building a
Better Bounty, supra note 31, at 687.
194 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Il. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 345-46 (1971).
195 See supra Part iI.B (discussing the social welfare benefits of successful validity contests).
196 Michael Risch, Patent Challenges and Royalty Inflation, 85 IND. L.J. 1003, 1022 (2010).
197 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate After
Medlmmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 1001 n.121 (2009).
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validating the patent "while its competitors enjoy the outcome for free.' 98
Consequently, there is an incentive to sit back and hope that "someone else
will do the hard work of putting the invention into the public domain."' 99
Last, but certainly not least, the sheer cost of patent litigation creates
an additional barrier for plaintiffs considering pursuing declaratory relief.
Patent litigation is notoriously expensive, prolonged, and unpredictable-
the proverbial "sport of kings. '2°° Parties contemplating patent litigation
face some daunting statistics: the suit will likely cost between $500,000 and
$4 million to adjudicate; 20' the average duration of patent suits in district
court is about two years; 2 2 and there is a high likelihood that the case will
be appealed to the Federal Circuit and ultimately reversed.203 These exorbi-
tant costs are simply too much for many parties to bear, and the end result is
that bad patents regularly go unchallenged.
Scholars have considered these various disincentives for authoritative
testing of patent validity and have suggested a number of solutions. Profes-
sors Jay Kesan and Mark Lemley have both proposed litigation-stage fee
shifting as a way to lighten the burden of determining validity for putative
infringers.2 4 Kesan supports a one-way fee-shifting scheme that favors the
party contesting validity when the patent is invalidated "based on prior art
that should have been discovered by [the patentee] through a reasonable
prior art search.""2 5 Along similar lines, Lemley argues that fee shifting may
be appropriate "[w]here the validity issue wasn't close."2 6
Other scholars, including Professors John Thomas and Joseph Miller,
have urged the use of financial rewards to encourage third party participa-
tion in validity contests. Thomas advances a regime of cash prizes, or boun-
ties, awarded by the PTO to private citizens who provide the agency with
198 Id.; Thomas, supra note 31, at 340 (discussing the problem of competitors taking "[a] free ride
off another's opposition to the patent").
199 Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 197, at 1001 n.121.
200 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on
Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). But see Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent
Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011) (arguing that certain events, such as changes in ownership of a
patent, can help predict patent litigation).
201 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 200, at 2.
202 Robert Greene Sterne, Jon E. Wright & Lori A. Gordon, Reexamination Practice with Concur-
rent District Court Litigation or Section 337 USITC Investigations, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 115, 149
(2009); see also 110 CONG. REc. H 1430-31 (daily ed. Feb 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. Howard Ber-
man) ("Federal district court judges spend an inordinate amount of time on patent cases, even though
patent cases only make up 1 percent of the docket.").
203 Jed Rakoff, Lecture: Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of Economic Exper-
tise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4, 12 (2012) ("District courts suffered a forty percent reversal rate
in the Federal Circuit, compared to a less than five percent reversal rate in all other circuits.").
204 Kesan, supra note 31, at 795-97; Lemley, supra note 31, at 1530-31.
205 Kesan, supra note 3 1, at 795.
206 Lemley, supra note 31, at 1530.
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information relevant to patentability. 2 7 The purpose of Professor Thomas's
bounty is to "recruit[] members of the public to act as private patent exam-
iners' 'z 1 in order to prevent the PTO from issuing poor quality patents in the
first place. Professor Miller's proposal, on the other hand, targets only those
commercially significant patents that are the subject of litigation.2 ° Miller's
litigation-stage bounty is awarded to parties who successfully void patents
"on a ground that the patentee could have prevented by diligently and can-
didly researching, drafting, and prosecuting its patent application. 210 Miller
further suggests that the patentee should be the one to pay the bounty, and
that the court will determine the amount of the prize based on the patentee's
past profits.2 '
More recently, Professor Miller has taken a different tack to the disin-
centive problem, advocating for joint defense agreements among competi-
tors so that they can share the cost of validity challenges. 2 Like his earlier
proposal, Miller's latest method for encouraging validity challenges focuses
on patent litigation rather than prosecution. But here the change would be
doctrinal, as opposed to statutory." 3 Specifically, courts should overrule
Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan,214 a pre-Blonder-Tongue decision that im-
poses per se antitrust liability for patent joint defense agreements." 5 Be-
cause joint defense agreements serve the social welfare and comply with
our antitrust laws, Professor Miller argues that competitors should be al-
lowed to rely on them so that a greater number of poor quality patents will
be challenged and invalidated each year.
21
No doubt finding a solution to this incentive problem is a high priority.
These pragmatic barriers to suit dissuade many parties from affirmatively
testing patent validity, even in cases where the challenger would have a
good chance of prevailing on the merits. The hope is that the AlA's post-
grant review procedure will make some progress toward alleviating this
problem." 7 It is understood, however, that privately initiated litigation in
federal court will remain an essential tool in the effort to eliminate mistak-
enly issued patents.2"'
207 Thomas, supra note 3 1, at 342.
208 Id. at 343.
209 Miller, Building a Better Bounty, supra note 31, at 705.
210 Id. at707.
211 Id. at 711-12.
212 Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture?, supra note 31, 5.
213 id.
214 244 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd in relevant part, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1966).
215 Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture?, supra note 31, 3.
216 See id. at 2 (stating that under our current system there are "[t]oo many settlements, and too few
definitive patent challenges").
217 Carrier, supra note 139, at 115-20 (arguing the benefits of post-grant review).
218 See supra Part I.A (discussing limitations of post-grant review proceedings).
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So, identifying some way to lessen the disincentives to validity suits
currently in place is a worthy objective. Yet, that is not the pursuit of this
Article. As discussed in Parts III and IV, this Article focuses instead on
certain doctrinal obstacles encountered by those parties who, notwithstand-
ing all the previously mentioned disincentives, still wish to contest a patent
in federal court.
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT JURISPRUDENCE: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
CURRENT APPROACH TO STANDING AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Cognizant of the disincentives and risks associated with affirmative
patent challenges, some parties nevertheless remain interested in pursuing
declaratory relief.2 .9 There are different reasons why a party might choose
to act as a private attorney general and affirmatively test a patent. Some
private parties want to clear any doubts about whether their products in-
fringe a valid patent.2"' Others may decide that the potential upside of inval-
idating the patent is worth the risk and cost associated with litigation be-
cause the potential payoff is substantial.2 ' Another possibility is that a puta-
tive infringer who knows patent litigation is inevitable might file a declara-
tory judgment action to secure a convenient and friendly forum rather than
waiting to be sued for infringement in the patent owner's court of choice.222
Or sometimes, as we have witnessed recently, advocacy groups may insti-
gate validity contests regarding patents they consider particularly harmful
to the public.23
Whatever the reason, these plaintiffs have taken the first step toward
vindicating a crucial interest-the elimination of potentially worthless pa-
tents. 24 Yet, they are often met with immediate resistance from the patent
219 See Moore, supra note 30, at 921 (stating that about 14 percent of the patent cases filed were
declaratory judgment actions).
220 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explain-
ing that, after the Declaratory Judgment Act, competitors "were no longer restricted to an in terrorem
choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment
of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of
interests"), overruled on other grounds by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
221 Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How Should
We Change?-The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 90 (2006) (illustrating the
risks and costs of litigation).
222 Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop
in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2012); La Belle, supra note 110, at 55-56.
223 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (challenging patents
relating to human genes); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n. v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (challenging patents covering genetically modified seed).
224 See generally Liza Vertinsky, Reconsidering Patent Licensing in the Aftermath of MedImmune,
45 Hous. L. REV. 1609, 1648 (2009).
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owner. In patent declaratory judgment actions, the defendant patent owner
often responds to the complaint with two concurrent motions. Defendants
move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a standing theory, 25 as
well as under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. If the plaintiff
is unable to demonstrate either of these threshold requirements, the court
will grant the motion(s) to dismiss and the merits of the underlying validity
challenge will remain unresolved.226
Standing and personal jurisdiction are distinct doctrines emanating
from separate constitutional provisions. Standing stems from the "case or
controversy" clause of Article 111,227 while personal jurisdiction flows from
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.228 On the
other hand, these two doctrines share much in common. First, they are both
"jurisdictional bedrocks" that must be satisfied for the court to proceed to
the merits of the case.229 Second, as noted, defendants often raise both as
grounds for dismissal in response to patent declaratory judgment actions.23 °
Third, the Federal Circuit has deemed both standing and personal jurisdic-
tion as procedural questions that are "intimately involved in the substance
of enforcement of the patent right," meaning Federal Circuit law-as op-
posed to the law of the regional circuit-will govern these issues in patent
cases.2 1' And finally, as I argue in Part IV, the Federal Circuit improperly
views both of these doctrines through the lens of a private law paradigm.
Before turning to that argument, however, this Part discusses the current
state of Federal Circuit law regarding standing and personal jurisdiction.
225 Courts refer to this requirement interchangeably as standing, the actual case or controversy
requirement, or declaratory judgment jurisdiction. For simplicity's sake, this Article consistently refers
to this requirement as standing.
226 See supra Part II (discussing the problems caused by bad patents).
227 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009).
228 See, e.g., Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[l]n
federal question cases, personal jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.").
229 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999) (distinguishing between the
"two jurisdictional bedrocks" of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, rejecting the no-
tion "that subject-matter jurisdiction is ever and always the more 'fundamental,"' and clarifying that
"[plersonal jurisdiction, too, is 'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court,' without
which the court is 'powerless to proceed to an adjudication."' (second alteration in original) (quoting
Emp'rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937))).
230 See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122 (2007); Avocent Huntsville Corp.
v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
231 GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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A. Standing to Sue in Patent Declaratory Judgment Actions
1. The Evolution of Standing Doctrine
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits the judicial power
of the United States to "cases" and "controversies. 232 Courts have held that
various justiciability doctrines derive from this provision, including the
requirement that plaintiffs have standing to sue in federal court.233 Since
Article III precludes advisory opinions, the primary function of the standing
doctrine is to ensure that federal courts resolve only genuine controversies
between adverse parties. 34
Standing has evolved over time into a complicated and somewhat er-
ratic doctrine. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court relied on stand-
ing to protect progressive legislation from judicial attack.235 The Court held
that plaintiffs in these early cases lacked standing to sue because they al-
leged only the violation of a public-rather than a private-right. 236 By
mid-century, however, the Court sought to expand its oversight of the other
branches of government and to grant public interest groups greater access to
federal court. 23 7 Recognizing that the "private rights" approach to standing
was too restrictive, the Court adopted a new model for standing in public
law cases. Specifically, the Court established that plaintiffs asserting viola-
tions of public rights had standing as long as they had suffered an "injury in
fact, economic or otherwise. 238 Thus, private citizens could sue to vindicate
232 U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
233 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009); see also Chayes, supra
note 58, at 8 ("The Court's preoccupation with the problem of standing to sue is a relatively recent
phenomenon. In the classical lawsuit, the standing problem could hardly arise." (footnote omitted)).
234 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968). States, on the other hand, are not bound by Article
I11, and so many permit their highest courts to render advisory opinions to legislatures, executive offic-
ers, or other courts. See Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 684.
235 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992).
236 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 464 (1939) ("No matter how seriously infringement of
the Constitution may be called into question, this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those
who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate, apart from a political concern which
belongs to all."); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922) (holding that the only right asserted
by the plaintiff was "the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be adminis-
tered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted," and that "this general right does not
entitle a private citizen to institute... suit").
237 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275,
292-93 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 235, at 183.
238 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The Court
defined injury in fact broadly to include aesthetic, conservational, recreational, and spiritual injuries. Id.
at 154.
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public interests as long as the challenged action affected the plaintiff in
some way.
239
As the Supreme Court moved toward a public law model of standing,
Congress enacted numerous statutes with citizen suit provisions, especially
in the environmental area.2' The Clean Air Act, for instance, authorized
any private citizen to sue a regulated entity on behalf of the public to force
compliance with the new environmental laws.24' So, through these citizen
suit provisions, Congress attempted to confer standing on a broad class of
plaintiffs who could act as private attorneys general to vindicate the public
interest.242
With this expansion in standing from the judicial and legislative
branches came a rise in public interest litigation.243 In addition to environ-
mental suits,2 4 private citizens brought court challenges to various tax poli-
cies, 245 racial discrimination, 246 and the death penalty.247 The Supreme Court
responded by restricting the standing doctrine in piecemeal fashion. After
holding that injury in fact is an Article III requirement, 248 the Court added
both causation and redressability as prongs to the standing analysis.249
These restrictions on standing culminated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life,25° in which the Supreme Court "established that the irreducible consti-
tutional minimum of standing contains three elements."25' The plaintiff first
must demonstrate that she suffered, or has been threatened with, an injury
in fact.252 An injury in fact is a concrete and particularized invasion of a
239 See generally Sunstein, supra note 235, at 185 (stating that "beneficiaries of regulatory pro-
grams would generally have standing" under the public law model).
240 See id. at 192-93.
241 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
242 The question whether Congress has the power to confer Article Ill standing has been the subject
of much debate. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (holding that
Congress could not confer Article Ill standing), with Sunstein, supra note 235, at 222-23 (arguing that
standing depends on whether Congress has conferred a right to bring suit).
243 See generally Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 224-42 (1976) (describing the "second wave" of public interest litigation,
beginning in the 1960s and 1970s).
244 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
245 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
246 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
247 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
248 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 224 & n.14.
249 Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 & n.19; Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42 ("[Tlhe 'case or controversy' limita-
tion of Art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third
party not before the court.").
250 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
251 Id. at 560.
252 Id.
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legally protected interest; it must be "actual or imminent," as opposed to
"conjectural or hypothetical. '253 The second element is a causal connection
between the injury and the defendant's conduct, meaning that at least some
portion of the plaintiff's injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant rather
than to a third party.254 The final element is that the relief requested is likely
to redress the plaintiff's injury. 255 For a federal court to consider the merits
of a case, at least one plaintiff must meet all three of these standing re-
quirements.
256
In Lujan and the cases leading up to it, the Court reasoned that stand-
ing serves to preserve the separation of powers among the three branches of
our federal government. 257 Without limitations on standing, any person
could ask the courts to interfere with the political branches of govern-
ment.258 This separation of powers concern was even more pronounced in a
case like Lujan that involved a citizen suit provision because Congress was
"transfer[ring] from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty," that is, "to 'take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.' 259 In the Lujan Court's view, "[v]indicating the public
interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive," not the
253 id.
254 id.
255 On top of these constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court has identified certain prudential
limits to standing: (1) plaintiff generally may not assert rights of a third party; (2) taxpayer plaintiff may
not sue regarding a common grievance; and (3) plaintiffs claim must be within the "zone of interests"
of the relevant statute. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 61 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION]. The first prudential limitation is intended to promote "fairness
by ensuring that people will raise only their own right and concerns," rather than allowing a third party's
rights to be adjudicated without the consent of the third party. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 61-62 (3d ed. 2006). Arguably, the Federal Circuit has limited standing
in patent declaratory judgment actions based on this "third party standing" prudential concern rather
than constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because defendant had not directed any affirmative acts at
them). However, since the Federal Circuit claims its standing analysis is grounded in constitutional
principles, this Article will focus on constitutional standing doctrine as well.
256 Home v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) ("[I]n all standing inquiries, the critical question is
whether at least one petitioner has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction."' (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 493 (2009))).
257 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992); see also Heather Elliott, Con-
gress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REv. 159, 175-76 (2011) (describing different
views of how the standing doctrine effects the separation of powers); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983)
(arguing that standing limits the role of the judicial branch and prevents it from encroaching upon the
elected branches of government).
258 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77.
259 Id. at 577.
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judicial branch.2" The Court supported this conclusion by citing its early
twentieth-century cases that denied standing on the ground that plaintiffs
alleged only the violation of a public right. 6' In short, the Court in Lujan
returned to a "private rights" model of standing that restricts plaintiffs to
asserting their own private interests rather than the interests of the public at
large.
262
2. The Federal Circuit's Standing Doctrine Before MedImmune
Standing problems occur in all types of cases, but they are common-
place in anticipatory, or preventive, adjudication where the plaintiff seeks a
remedy to avoid future harm rather than damages to compensate for past
injuries.263 In patent declaratory judgment actions, the plaintiff often sues
the patent owner before it has undertaken any infiinging activity or violated
any rights, and so the plaintiff has not yet suffered an injury at the time of
suit. Patent declaratory judgment actions, therefore, fall neatly within the
preventive adjudication paradigm and provide fertile ground for standing
challenges.2"
Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit has struggled to define
the parameters of standing in patent declaratory judgment actions. 265 Almost
two decades ago, the Federal Circuit pronounced that standing requires
more "than the [mere] existence of an adversely held patent. ' 266 Although
260 Id. at 576.
261 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 464 (1939) ("No matter how seriously infringement of
the Constitution may be called into question, this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those
who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate, apart from a political concern which
belongs to all."); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922) (holding that the only right asserted
by plaintiff was "the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be administered
according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted," and that "this general right does not entitle
a private citizen to institute ... suit").
262 Hessick, supra note 237, at 289-90 & n.86.
263 See Bray, supra note 146, at 1300 (noting that standing doctrine limits preventive adjudication);
Hessick, supra note 237, at 291 (noting that standing doctrine evolved, in part, because of the creation
of nontraditional actions like declaratory judgment actions).
264 Bray, supra note 146, at 1276; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128
n.8 (2007) ("The justiciability problem that arises, when the party seeking declaratory relief is himself
preventing the complained-of injury from occurring, can be described in terms of standing (whether
plaintiff is threatened with 'imminent' injury in fact 'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant." (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992))).
265 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (creating the Federal
Circuit).
266 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Notably, the Federal
Circuit's pronouncement conflicts with the Supreme Court's statement in Cardinal Chemical that
"[m]erely the desire to avoid the threat of a 'scarecrow' patent" may "be sufficient to establish jurisdic-
tion under the Declaratory Judgment Act." Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96
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the Federal Circuit has never rationalized this bright-line rule, courts have
echoed this sentiment time and again and consistently have held that an
adverse patent alone is insufficient to confer standing.267 Yet, the Federal
Circuit has been much less coherent in resolving what types of circum-
stances are sufficient to establish standing in patent declaratory relief suits.
For many years, the Federal Circuit required satisfaction of a two-part
test to establish standing in patent declaratory relief actions. The plaintiff
was required to show that it: (1) had an objectively reasonable apprehension
of suit at the time the suit was filed; and (2) produced, or made meaningful
preparations to produce, an allegedly infringing product. 268 The first prong
of this test required either an "explicit threat" or some other conduct by the
patentee that made the plaintiff reasonably apprehensive of infringement
litigation.269 Certain factors rendered a declaratory judgment plaintiff's ap-
prehension "presumptively reasonable," including prior infringement ac-
tions by the patentee against competitors involving the same technology
and threats by the patent owner to sue the plaintiffs customers for in-
fringement 7 °
The second prong of the Federal Circuit's standing test, on the other
hand, focused on the plaintiffs conduct. It asked whether the plaintiff was
producing an infringing product or had at least made "meaningful prepara-
tion[s]" toward infringing activity. 27' This requirement was intended to en-
sure that the plaintiff has a real interest to be protected by the declaratory
judgment, and to preclude advisory opinions on whether "some merely con-
templated activity" might be infringing. 272 The Federal Circuit recognized
that this prong is easily satisfied when the plaintiff is actually producing,
selling, or using the allegedly infringing product, but the question of
"meaningful preparations" is a more difficult one that must be resolved on a
case-by-case basis.
273
(1993). This is particularly telling since the Supreme Court made this statement in Cardinal Chemical
just months before the Federal Circuit decided BP Chemical. This question of whether an adverse patent
alone is sufficient to confer standing is an important and difficult matter that remains to be explored in
future work.
267 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub
nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012); Prasco, LLC v.
Medicis Pharm.. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc.,
387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TriTeq Lock & Sec. LLC v. Innovative Secured Solutions, LLC,
No. I0-CV-1304, 2012 WL 394229, at *4 (N.D. II1. Feb. 1,2012).
268 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
269 BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978.
270 See, e.g., Sirius Satellite Research Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., No. 05-CV-7495(PAC), 2006
WL 238999, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2006).
271 Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1336 n.4.
272 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
273 Id.
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In Gen-Probe v. Vysis, 274 the Federal Circuit applied this two-part test
to decide whether a nonrepudiating licensee had standing to sue the patent
owner for declaratory relief. 275 There was no doubt that Gen-Probe met the
second prong because it was producing a product, so the question con-
cerned the reasonable apprehension portion of the test.2176 Vysis, the patent
owner, argued that there could not be a reasonable apprehension of suit
since the license protected Gen-Probe from an infringement charge.277 The
Federal Circuit agreed with Vysis and held that nonrepudiating licensees
must breach the license agreement (for instance, by ceasing royalty pay-
ments) in order to create standing.278 Within a few years, however, the Gen-
Probe rule reached the Supreme Court and was reversed." 9
3. The MedImmune Decision
In MedImmune v. Genetech,28° the Supreme Court held that nonrepudi-
ating licensees potentially have standing to bring patent declaratory judg-
ment actions.28" ' Reversing the Federal Circuit, the Court explained that Ar-
ticle III's standing requirement does not obligate a nonrepudiating licensee
to terminate or breach its license agreement before seeking declaratory re-
lief.82 The patent licensee should not have to "bet the farm, so to speak, by
taking the violative action." '283 In other words, the Court identified a signifi-
cant mismatch between the Gen-Probe rule and the underlying purpose of
the Declaratory Judgment Act, which is to prevent the violation of rights by
facilitating anticipatory adjudication.284
While Medlmmune involved a nonrepudiating licensee's standing to
sue, the Supreme Court in its opinion painted with a broader brush. It at-
tacked the Federal Circuit's standing test more generally, stating that the
reasonable apprehension prong conflicted with Supreme Court precedent.285
It held, instead, that questions of standing in all patent declaratory judgment
274 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118(2007).
275 A nonrepudiating licensee, or a licensee in good standing, is a licensee who has paid the requi-
site royalties and complied with all other provisions of the license agreement. See id. at 1379.
276 id. at 1377, 1379.
277 id. at 1381.
278 id.
279 Medlimmune, 549 U.S. at 137.
280 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
281 Id. at 137.
282 id.
283 Id. at 129.
284 See supra Part Il.B (discussing the history and purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
285 Medmmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.1 I.
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actions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 286 The inquiry should be
"whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment. 28 7 In deciding whether the constitutional prerequisites for stand-
ing are satisfied-injury in fact, causation, and redressability-the court
must consider the totality of the circumstances. 28' Applying this standard,
the Court held that Medlmmune had standing to seek a declaration of patent
invalidity from the court even though the license agreement had not been
breached.289
The MedImmune Court's standing analysis is significant for many rea-
sons. Most obviously, it is the controlling law on standing in patent declara-
tory judgment actions, and so the Federal Circuit is bound by it and must
apply it.29 But more to the point of this Article, Medlmmune's holistic ap-
proach to standing hearkens back to the Court's pre-Lujan public law model
of standing. Like the earlier public law model, the MedImmune standard
focuses on more than the private law relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant.29" ' It looks instead to all the circumstances to determine whether
the defendant's conduct wronged (or threatened to wrong) the plaintiff in
some way.
292
More importantly, Medlmmune's holistic approach to standing and the
Court's public law standing model share a common objective: to facilitate
lawsuits and provide greater access to courts. The Court transitioned to an
injury-in-fact requirement in the 1960s so public interest groups and other
private citizens had standing to litigate matters that would improve the so-
cial welfare.2 93 And while the Court no longer prioritizes access to federal
286 Id. at 127.
287 Id. (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
288 id.
289 Id. at 137.
290 See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("[W]e must 'follow Medlmmune's teaching to look at 'all the circumstances' to determine whether [an
action for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement or patent invalidity presents] a justiciable Article
IIl controversy." (alteration in original) (quoting Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482
F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007))).
291 See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 n.I (1970).
292 Medmmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 133; Camp, 397 U.S. at 152 (holding that standing depends on
"whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise").
293 See, e.g., Camp, 397 U.S. at 154 ("Certainly he who is 'likely to be financially' injured may be
a reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest in the present case.") (cita-
tion omitted); id. ("Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people
who may protest administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved 'per-
sons' is symptomatic of that trend.").
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court for many types of public law cases, 294 that is not true for patent validi-
ty challenges. The Supreme Court has consistently held that these cases
must be encouraged and facilitated in order to rid the system of bad pa-
tents.2 95 In the same vein, Medlmmune clearly intended to facilitate standing
in patent declaratory judgment actions so as to ease the burden on parties
wishing to challenge invalid patents.296 Yet, even after MedImmune, Federal
Circuit standing doctrine remains a serious impediment to declaratory relief
in patent cases.
4. The Federal Circuit's Standing Doctrine After MedImmune
Since Medlmmune, which was decided only five years ago, the param-
eters of this totality-of-the-circumstances standard have been a moving tar-
get. At first, the Federal Circuit and commentators viewed Medlmmune as a
drastic departure from prior law, and agreed that it would now be easier to
establish standing in affirmative patent validity contests.297 In the months
following MedImmune, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the Supreme
Court's revocation of its reasonable apprehension test and announced that it
would use the all-the-circumstances standard instead.298 One of these early
Federal Circuit cases explained:
Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position that puts the declarato-
ry judgment plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandon-
294 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that Congress could not
confer Article Ill standing); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (private citizen had no standing
to challenge death penalty).
295 See supra Part II.B (discussing the long line of Supreme Court cases encouraging patent validi-
ty contests); see also Glover, supra note 115, at 1143-45 (proposing that the optimal level of private
enforcement depends on the particular area of substantive law, the nature of the regulatory regime, and
the regulatory objectives).
296 Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 146 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority has given every patent
licensee a cause of action ... for challenging the validity of licensed patents."); see also Autogenomics,
Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The
evolving law under Medlmmune facilitates challenge to adversely held patents."); Benitec Austl., Ltd. v.
Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing the long line of
Supreme Court decisions, including Medlmmune, holding that "[tihere is a strong public interest in
permitting accused infringers to challenge invalid or unenforceable patents"); Dreyfuss & Pope, supra
note 197, at 973 ("Medlmmune appears to create new avenues for courts to police the implementation of
patent law and to release advances that should not have been patented into the public domain.").
297 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting
MedImmune's "more lenient legal standard"); see also Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V.
O'Shaughnessy, One Year After MedImmune-The Impact on Patent Licensing & Negotiation, 17 FED.
CIR. B.J. 401, 435 (2008) (stating that "[tihe new standard... make[s] it easier for accused infringers to
bring declaratory judgment action[s]").
298 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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ing that which he claims a right to do. We need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of each case. We hold only that where a
patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity
of another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused
activity without license, an Article Ill case or controversy will arise and the party need not
risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration
of its legal rights.
29 9
Not surprisingly, in the immediate wake of Medlmmune, the Federal Circuit
and lower courts were systematically denying motions to dismiss on the
grounds that plaintiffs had established standing under this more lenient all-
the-circumstances standard."'
Within a short time, though, the Federal Circuit began rolling back
standing doctrine in patent declaratory judgment actions. Although the Fed-
eral Circuit initially repudiated the reasonable apprehension test, it re-
embraced that rule in Prasco v. Medicis Pharmaceuticals.3"' Prasco held
that "proving a reasonable apprehension of suit is one of multiple ways that
a declaratory judgment plaintiff can satisfy the more general all-the-
circumstances test."3 2 According to the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court
in MedImmune simply "rejected the reasonable apprehension of suit test as
the sole test for" standing; it did not hold that reasonable apprehension was
wholly irrelevant to the standing analysis.30 3
An even more striking example of the Federal Circuit's backpedaling
is Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc.3"4 Unlike Prasco, the question in Cat
Tech concerned the viability of the second prong of the Federal Circuit's
former standing test-whether the plaintiff produced, or made meaningful
preparations to produce, an allegedly infringing product.3"5 The Federal
Circuit held that, even after MedImmune, the meaningful preparations
prong remains an "important element" for evaluating standing.3°" The court
explained that if the declaratory judgment plaintiff does not take significant,
concrete steps towards infringing activity, then "the dispute is neither 'im-
mediate' nor 'real' and the requirements for justiciability have not been
met.'"307 So even though the Federal Circuit claimed that the meaningful
preparations prong is merely an "important element" of standing, the court
299 SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381.
300 See id.; Teva, 482 F.3d at 1339.
30' 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
302 Id. at 1336.
303 Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
304 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
305 Id. at 878-79.
306 Id. at 880.
307 Id. (emphasis added).
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treated it as a requirement.3"8 Simply put, Cat Tech reinstated the second
prong of the Federal Circuit's pre-Medlmmune standing test.3"9
And then in Myriad, the Federal Circuit dealt another blow to Medim-
mune's all-the-circumstances test. 3" In Myriad, the ACLU and PUBPAT-
representing twenty medical organizations, genetics researchers, clinicians,
and cancer patients-initiated a declaratory judgment action challenging
certain controversial human gene patents related to breast and ovarian can-
cer.3 ' Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Myriad's patents were invalid
because human genes, as products of nature, are not patentable subject mat-
ter.312 Myriad responded predictably by moving to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing.313 The district court determined that all twenty plaintiffs had standing,
declared the patents invalid, and granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. 14
Myriad appealed to the Federal Circuit both on standing grounds and
on the merits of the validity claim.3"5 With respect to standing, the three-
judge panel affirmed the lower court, albeit on far narrower grounds.316 The
Federal Circuit held that only one of the twenty plaintiffs, Dr. Harry Ostrer,
had standing to sue because he alone demonstrated the requisite injury in
fact.3"7 The court then proceeded to the merits and reversed the lower
court's finding of invalidity, at least as to most of the patent claims.3"8 Spe-
cifically, the court held that Myriad's claims directed to isolated genes re-
cite patentable subject matter, but some of its method claims do not.3"9
For purposes of this Article, the Myriad court's ultimate decision on
the standing question does not matter much, but its rationale is critically
important and will have enduring effects on affirmative validity challenges
308 id.
309 See, e.g., Ours Tech., Inc. v. Data Drive Thru, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836-37 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing in patent declaratory judgment action because it failed to
satisfy the meaningful preparations requirement).
310 See La Belle, supra note 32, at 82.
311 Id. at 69.
312 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub
nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). Plaintiffs also
sued the PTO asserting certain constitutional claims, but the district court and Federal Circuit decided
the case on patent validity grounds.
313 id. at 1341.
314 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd in
part, rev 'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
315 Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1333.
316 Id. at 1344.
317 id.
318 Id. at 1334.
319 id.
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going forward 2° While the Federal Circuit claimed to follow Medlmmune's
all-the-circumstances standard, it actually applied a rigid two-part test to
evaluate standing. The Myriad court held that to establish an injury in fact
traceable to the patent owner, plaintiffs in declaratory judgment suits "must
allege both (1) an affirmative act by the patentee related to the enforcement
of his patent rights, and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially
infringing activity. 3 21 What is more, the Federal Circuit heightened the first
prong of this test by requiring the patentee's affirmative acts to be directed
at the plaintiff as opposed to a third party.3 2 Thus, Myriad crystallized the
Federal Circuit's retrogression toward an inflexible, formalistic approach to
standing that makes it far too difficult for patent declaratory judgment suits
to survive early dismissal.
Plaintiffs in Myriad filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court that raised questions as to both standing and the underlying merits of
the case.323 On March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the certiorari
petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded Myriad to the Federal Circuit
for further consideration in light of the Court's recent decision in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. ,324 another patent-
able subject matter case.325 Myriad returned to the Federal Circuit for oral
argument on July 20, 2012, and the court issued its second opinion in the
case less than a month later.326 Although the Federal Circuit's opinion in
Myriad II revisited the standing question, there was no change in the court's
320 In an earlier article, I analyzed the Federal Circuit's opinion in Myriad and argued that the
court's decision that only one plaintiff had standing was incorrect in light of Supreme Court precedent,
including Medlmmune, Lujan, and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. See La Belle, supra note 32, at 70.
321 Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1343 (citation omitted).
322 ld. at 1344 (narrowing the potential plaintiffs with standing to those who could "allege affirma-
tive patent enforcement actions directed at them by Myriad" (emphasis added)); id at 1348 ("The dis-
trict court failed to limit its jurisdictional holding to affirmative acts by the patentee directed at specific
Plaintiffs ... and thus we reverse the district court's holding." (citation omitted)).
323 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1794 (2012) (No. 11-725), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/association of molecular_v
myriad_petition forwrit of certiorari.pdf. The question presented regarding standing is:
Did the court of appeals err in adopting a new and inflexible rule, contrary to normal stand-
ing rules and this Court's decision in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007), that petitioners who have been indisputably deterred by Myriad's "active enforce-
ment" of its patent rights nonetheless lack standing to challenge those patents absent evi-
dence that they have been personally and directly threatened with an infringement action?
Id.
324 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
325 Myriad, 132 S. Ct. at 1794.
326 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, No. 2010-1406, 2012 WL 3518509 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16,
2012) ("Myriad 11").
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conclusion or rationale.3"7 If the case returns to the Supreme Court, howev-
er, the question of standing may come to the forefront once again.
In the meantime, the impact of Myriad has already been felt far and
wide. Courts evaluating standing according to the Myriad framework con-
sistently have held in favor of patent owners and dismissed cases for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.32s One example is Organic Seed Growers &
Trade Ass 'n v. Monsanto, another high-profile patent challenge initiated by
PUBPAT.329 In Monsanto, PUBPAT filed a declaratory judgment action
against Monsanto on behalf of a large group of farmers and seed companies
seeking to invalidate certain patents covering genetically modified, or
transgenic, seed.33° Relying on Myriad, Monsanto moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had standing.' Monsanto
argued that the plaintiffs could not meet the first prong of the Myriad test
because there was no "act by Monsanto directed toward a specific Plain-
tiff."'332 Similarly, Monsanto contended, the plaintiffs fell short because they
failed to "show a likelihood of imminent 'potentially infringing activity,"'
as required by Myriad.333 Just like other post-Myriad decisions,334 the Mon-
santo court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss.3 The plaintiffs have appealed the Monsanto deci-
sion to the Federal Circuit,336 and the court will likely hear oral argument in
early 2013.
327 Id. at *8-14. The panel did not change its decision with respect to the merits of the case either.
328 See McGlothlin v. Drake, No. 1:11 CV00055JH, 2012 WL 1768098, at *3 (E.D. Ark. May 16,
2012); Cherdak v. Vock, No. 1:11 -cv-1311, 2012 WL 1427847 (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2012); Asius Techs.,
LLC v. Sonion US, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 554 (N.D. III. 2011); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Kelora Sys. LLC, No.
C I 1-3938-CW, 2011 WL 6101545, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec 7, 2011); Proofpoint, Inc. v. InNova Patent
Licensing, LLC, No. 5:1 I-CV-02288-LHK, 2011 WL 4915847 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011); JIA Jewelry
Imps. of Am., Inc. v. Pandora Jewelry, LLC, No. CCB-l 1-982, 2011 WL 4566118 (D. Md. Sept. 29,
2011).
329 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n. v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
see also Julia Moskin, Modified Crops Tap a Wellspring of Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/dining/a-suit-airs-debate-on-organic-vs-modified-crops.html;
Controversy over Patents on Genetically-Modified Seeds, WICN (Jan. 8, 2012) http://www.wicn.org/
podcasts/audio/daniel-ravicher-all-new.
330 First Amended Complaint J [i 4-5, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n. v. Monsanto Co., 851
F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 2163(NRB)).
331 Reply Memorandum in Support of Monsanto's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction at 1, Monsanto, 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (No. 11 Civ. 2163(NRB)).
332 Id. at 6.
333 Id. at 9.
334 See supra note 328 and accompanying text (discussing post-Myriad standing decisions).
335 Reply Memorandum, supra note 331, at 9 (concluding that plaintiffs failed to show any af-
firmative act directed at them by defendant Monsanto).
336 Brief of Appellants, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n. v. Monsanto Co., No. 12-1298
(Fed. Cir. July 5, 2012).
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With high-profile cases like Medlmmune and Myriad, the issue of
standing in patent declaratory judgment actions has garnered some atten-
tion. 37 Yet, the second jurisdictional hurdle that declaratory judgment
plaintiffs face-personal jurisdiction-has largely been overlooked by
scholars.3" From a patent challenger's perspective, however, establishing
personal jurisdiction can be a real problem, especially when the patent
owner is a foreign entity.
B. Personal Jurisdiction in Patent Declaratory Judgment Actions
1. The Fundamentals of Personal Jurisdiction
The personal jurisdiction doctrine limits a court's ability to bind a par-
ticular defendant to the judgment of that court.3 9 Notions of due process
serve as the theoretical underpinnings for the personal jurisdiction doc-
trine.34° Since International Shoe Co. v. Washington,34 ' defendant's contacts
with the forum state have been the touchstone of modem personal jurisdic-
tion law. The question for the court is whether the nonresident defendant
has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. "'342
Two profiles of personal jurisdiction have evolved since International
Shoe: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.343 A court may exercise
general jurisdiction only when a defendant has "continuous and systematic"
337 See, e.g., Levine & Belle, supra note 157, at 494-95; Kelsey I. Nix & Laurie Stempler, The
Federal Circuit's Interpretation and Application of the MedImmune Standard for Declaratory Judg-
ment Jurisdiction, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331,332 (2011).
338 See La Belle, supra note 110, at 46.
339 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
340 Ins. Corp. of lr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). At times, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the personal jurisdiction doctrine also protects state sovereignty. See J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786-87 (2011) (plurality opinion); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). Several scholars, and the Court itself,
have called this position into question. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 702 ("The requirement that
a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. Ill, but from the Due Process Clause."); see also
Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to
Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 19, 20 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1120
(1981).
341 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
342 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
343 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984).
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contacts that render it "essentially at home in the forum [s]tate." 3" Where
such contacts exist, the defendant is subject to suit in the forum state on any
type of claim even if unrelated to the defendant's contacts.345
Specific jurisdiction requires less pervasive contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum state,346 but the plaintiffs claim must arise out of or
be related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state.347 Besides this
nexus requirement, the defendant's contacts with the forum state also must
be purposeful,348 and the exercise of specific jurisdiction must be fair and
reasonable. 49 On this last point, the court will consider various factors in
evaluating fairness, including: (1) "the burden on the defendant"; (2) "the
interests of the forum state"; (3) "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief";
(4) "'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies'"; and (5) the states' "'shared interest[s] . .. in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' 35 Where the other
elements of specific jurisdiction are met, a defendant may only defeat juris-
diction on fairness grounds by marshaling a "compelling case."35' On the
other hand, these fairness "considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts
than would otherwise be required." '352
These jurisdictional constructs provide standards for both litigants and
lower courts regarding the personal jurisdiction analysis. Yet, the Supreme
344 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
341 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15.
346 See, e.g., McGee v. lnt'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (holding that even a single
contact can be sufficient for specific jurisdiction).
347 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 ("Adjudicatory authority is 'specific' when the suit 'aris[es] out
of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum."' (alterations in original) (quoting Helicople-
ros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8)); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16 (noting that claims must "arise out of' or be
"related to" defendant's contacts for specific jurisdiction).
348 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). This purposeful availment requirement protects
parties from having to defend themselves against lawsuits in distant forums based solely on "'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). An
issue that the Supreme Court has grappled with is whether a defendant can purposefully avail itself of a
forum state by placing products into the stream of commerce that ultimately are purchased by customers
there. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Notwithstanding multiple attempts, the Supreme Court
has failed to agree on the parameters of the stream of commerce doctrine. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers,
J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1245 (2011). However, because the stream of commerce doctrine is not central to the thesis of
this Article, it is unnecessary to discuss it in greater detail.
349 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
350 Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
31' Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Another theory of specific jurisdiction that the Supreme Court
has articulated is the effects test. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Under the effects test theory,
defendants may be subject to personal jurisdiction in states where they intentionally cause injury. Id. at
789-90.
352 Burger King, 471 U.S. at477.
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Court consistently has held that these are merely guideposts; bright-line
rules concerning personal jurisdiction should be eschewed.353 The ultimate
decision whether personal jurisdiction lies ought to be made on a case-by-
case basis considering the totality of the circumstances.354 Despite this clear
mandate from the Court, however, the Federal Circuit has adopted various
special rules for personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment ac-
tions.
2. Personal Jurisdiction and Cease-and-Desist Letters
While the facts giving rise to patent declaratory judgment actions vary,
these litigation stories often involve similar plotlines. Assume Company X,
the putative infringer, receives a cease-and-desist letter from Company Y,
the patent owner, at Company X's headquarters in Los Angeles, California;
the letter charges infringement and offers a license; after studying the pa-
tent, Company X decides it would like to seek a declaration of invalidity in
federal court.355 Under this scenario, Company X should have standing to
sue (even under the Federal Circuit's restrictive Myriad test) because there
was an explicit threat to sue and Company X produces an allegedly infring-
ing product. The question then becomes, where may Company X sue?
Company X likely wants to sue in the U.S. District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California, since that is where its headquarters are located. 56
But Company X may only sue in California if Company Y is subject to
either general or specific jurisdiction there.357 If Company Y has continuous
and systematic contacts with California sufficient to render it "at home,"
general jurisdiction will lie.358 The threshold for general jurisdiction is quite
353 See generally Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 834
(1995) (stating that, with respect to personal jurisdiction, the Supreme "Court has eschewed the oppor-
tunity to create definitive rules" and "has mandated case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry").
354 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
355 La Belle, supra note 110, at 47.
356 See id. at 53-57 (discussing the advantages of suing for declaratory relief at home); Moore,
supra note 30, at 914 (concluding that putative infringers significantly increase their chance of invalidat-
ing patents by controlling the forum and timing of suit).
357 Technically, the Central District of California also must be a proper venue for suit to proceed.
However, venue is proper in any judicial district where any defendant resides, and a corporation resides
in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West 2012).
Thus, when the patent owner is a corporation (which is almost always the case), the venue and personal
jurisdiction inquiries collapse into one. See La Belle, supra note 110, at 69.
358 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
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high, however, so in most cases the party wishing to challenge the patent
will have to rely on a theory of specific jurisdiction.359
At first blush, it seems that Company X could easily satisfy the basic
tenets of the specific jurisdiction doctrine. The patent owner, Company Y,
purposefully directed its activities at a California resident, Company X, by
mailing the cease-and-desist letter to the Los Angeles headquarters; moreo-
ver, the claim for declaratory relief undoubtedly arises out of Company Y's
activities in California. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly admitted
these circumstances "might be expected to support an assertion of specific
jurisdiction."3"
Yet, more than a decade ago, the Federal Circuit carved out an excep-
tion for cease-and-desist letters in the patent declaratory judgment context.
In Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. ,361 the court held that
a patent owner cannot subject itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum state
by sending cease-and-desist letters.362 The court grounded this exclusion on
the fairness prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis:
Principles of fair play and substantial justice afford a [patent owner] sufficient latitude to in-
form others of its patent rights without subjecting itself to personal jurisdiction in a foreign
forum .. .solely by informing a party who happens to be located there of suspected in-
fringement. Grounding personal jurisdiction on such contacts alone would not comport with
principles of fairness ... [because it] would ... provid[e] disincentives for the initiation of
settlement negotiations.
363
The Federal Circuit believed, in other words, that allowing the exercise of
personal jurisdiction under these circumstances would discourage the set-
tlement of patent litigation. And because it considered the policy favoring
settlement "manifest," the court adopted a bright-line rule intended to pro-
mote that policy.3"
In crafting this rule, the Federal Circuit never considered the other fac-
tors essential to the fairness inquiry, like the burden on the defendant, the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, or the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief. Nor did the Federal Circuit re-
359 This is particularly true after Goodyear where the Court held, among other things, that a de-
fendant cannot subject itself to general jurisdiction in a forum state by continuously and systematically
placing its products into the stream of commerce destined for the forum. See id at 2855.
360 Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that
cease-and-desist letters "might be expected to support an assertion of specific jurisdiction over the
patentee because 'the letters are "purposefully directed" at the forum and the declaratory judgment
action "arises out of' the letters' (quoting Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1202
(Fed. Cir. 2003))); Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (same).
361 148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
362 Id. at 1360.
363 ld at 1360-61 (emphasis added).
364 ld at 1361.
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quire the defendant to make a "compelling case" that the exercise of juris-
diction would be unfair as required by Supreme Court precedent.365 Rather,
the Federal Circuit implemented a per se rule that subsequent courts have
followed without question despite the mischief it has caused.366
Having pronounced that cease-and-desist letters do not "count" for
personal jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit then held that defendants must
engage in "other activities" directed at the forum and related to the claim
for the exercise of jurisdiction to be fair.367 For many years, the Federal
Circuit decided whether a defendant's "other activities" were sufficient for
jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis.36 That has recently changed, though,
and so now the Federal Circuit's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence looks
more exceptional than ever.
3. "Other Activities" Sufficient for Personal Jurisdiction
In the aftermath of Medlmmune, many feared the Supreme Court's de-
cision would open the floodgates to patent declaratory judgment actions.369
Some commentators contemplated solutions to this problem, such as the use
of termination clauses in license agreements to discourage validity chal-
lenges.37 Others undertook empirical research to weigh the actual impact of
MedImmune.37' While the precise consequences of MedImmune were uncer-
tain, the consensus among scholars and practitioners was that it would dra-
matically alter the landscape of our patent system.372
Even the Federal Circuit believed, at least initially, that MedImmune
was a game changer.73 Since MedImmune lowered the bar for standing in
patent declaratory judgment actions, the court recognized that fewer cases
365 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,477 (1985).
366 See La Belle, supra note 110, at 85-90 (arguing that the promotion of settlement justification is
flawed because the public benefits when patents are invalidated in court, not when patent disputes are
settled out of court).
367 See, e.g., Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
368 See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1334-36 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(summarizing prior case law).
369 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 146 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the majority's opinion opened the door for parties to seek advisory opinions because it "con-
tain[ed] no limiting principle whatsoever"); Levine & Belle, supra note 157, at 494 & n. 15 (collecting
commentary predicting that Medimmune would open the floodgates).
370 See Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 197, at 1003; Alfred C. Server & Peter Singleton, Licensee
Patent Validity Challenges Following MedImmune: Implications for Patent Licensing, 3 HASTINGS SC!.
& TECH. L.J. 243, 417 (2011).
371 Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 297, at 401-02; Levine & Belle, supra note 157, at 494-
95.
372 Levine & Belle, supra note 157, at 494 n.15.
373 See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the Federal Circuit's initial reaction to MedImmune).
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would be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.374 But instead of
accepting that fate, the Federal Circuit took steps to curb the effects of
Medlmmune. As discussed above, the court has backpedaled toward its pre-
Medlmmune bright-line test for standing.375 Concomitantly, in a series of
cases, the court significantly limited the specific jurisdiction doctrine in
patent declaratory judgment actions by narrowly defining the type of "other
activities" that subject a patent owner to suit in the challenger's home
state.376 The Federal Circuit itself has acknowledged this relationship be-
tween the standing and personal jurisdiction doctrines in patent declaratory
relief suits:
This [personal jurisdiction] inquiry should not be confused with the "case or controversy"
requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act. While the Supreme Court recently altered the
subject matter jurisdiction landscape by rejecting the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test,
the independent requirement of personal jurisdiction over the defendant remains an important
and independent limit on the power of the federal courts. Indeed, the extent to which declara-
tory judgment jurisdiction may be more easily found makes the personal jurisdiction inquiry
that much more important.
377
The first case in this series was Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten In-
ternational Co. 3 78 In that case, the patent owner, Aten, was a Taiwanese
company that competed with Avocent, a Delaware corporation headquar-
tered in Alabama, in the manufacture and sale of keyboard-video-mouse
switches. 379 Aten sent a cease-and-desist letter to Avocent's headquarters,
Avocent sued for declaratory relief in Alabama, and Aten moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 ° Cognizant of the Federal Circuit's spe-
cial rules for cease-and-desist letters, Avocent alleged that Aten engaged in
"other activities" in Alabama, namely significant commercial sales of its
patented products in brick and mortar stores like Best Buy and CompUSA,
as well as through internet retailers.38" '
In opposing Aten's motion, Avocent relied on Viam Corp. v. Iowa Ex-
port-Import Trading Co.,3t2 a closely analogous case. Like Avocent, Viam
involved a declaratory relief action against a foreign patent owner whose
only contacts with the forum state included sending a cease-and-desist letter
374 See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
375 See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the Federal Circuit's post-MedImmune standing doctrine).
376 Radio Sys. Corp. v. Accession, Inc., 638 F.3d 785, 789-91 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Autogenomics, Inc.
v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1019-20 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten
Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1334-36 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
377 Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1332 n.2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
378 552 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
379 Id at 1327.
380 Id. at 1327-28.
381 Id. at 1327.
382 84 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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to the putative infringer and selling and marketing products covered by the
patent-in-suit.383 Preliminarily, the Viam court determined that the personal
jurisdiction analysis in patent declaratory judgment actions should essen-
tially be the same as in patent infringement actions.3" Applying that stand-
ard, the Federal Circuit upheld jurisdiction because the patent owner had
"purposefully directed its activities at the forum State" and had "purpose-
fully initiated the interaction with Viam that resulted in the instant suit."'385
The court further held that the defendant failed to make a "compelling case"
that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unconstitutionally unfair.386 To the
contrary, the court explained, fairness weighed in favor of exercising juris-
diction "[o]therwise, out-of-state corporations would be able to set up do-
mestic fronts through which they could do business without subjecting their
patents to the rigorous scrutiny demanded by United States patent law." '387
Even though Viam was squarely on point, the Avocent court took the
"other activities" doctrine in a whole new direction.388 In a divided two-to-
one decision,389 the panel held that a patent owner's sales within the forum
383 Id. at 426-27.
384 ld. at 428 ("All the reasons for adopting and applying the stream of commerce theory to the
question of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state alleged infringer as defendant, fully explored in
Beverly Hills Fan, are equally applicable to the same question regarding an out-of-state patentee as
defendant.").
385 Id. at 429.
386 Id. at 429-30.
387 Id. at 430.
388 Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision conflicts with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
precedent). The Avocent majority claims that the patent owner in Viam had other contacts with the
forum state, namely an infringement suit in California against another competitor over the same patent.
Id. at 1335. It is true that the Federal Circuit mentioned another California action in the fairness portion
of its opinion. See Viam, 84 F.3d at 430. However, in order for that other lawsuit to be relevant to the
contacts analysis, it must have been initiated before November 10, 1993-the day Viam sued for declar-
atory relief--"as only contacts made prior to the commencement of suit qualify for [the] personal juris-
diction analysis." Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. C10-861 RSM, 2011 WL 31862, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2011); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90
(1938) (holding that events occurring after the institution of suit do not affect jurisdiction). Nothing
from the Federal Circuit's or district court's opinions indicates that the patent owner's other infringe-
ment suit was filed before November 10, 1993. See Viam, 84 F.3d 424; Viam Corp. v. Iowa Exp.-Imp.
Trading Co., No. CV 93-6816 RAP (JGx), 1995 WL 544971 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1995), rev'd in part,
vacated in part by 84 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Indeed, neither court even mentioned this other lawsuit
when analyzing defendant's contacts with California, which strongly suggests that the suit was filed
after Viam's declaratory judgment action. And finally, based on independent research, this Author has
discovered only one other suit filed by the patent owner in California, and it was filed more than a year
after Viam's declaratory judgment action. See Complaint, Spal S.R.L. v. Tesor Tech. Corp., 79 F.3d
1166 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (No. 2:95-cv-02013-RAP-JG). Thus, the majority's ex post attempts to distin-
guish Avocent from Viam fall short.
389 Judge Linn, joined by Judge Schall, authored the majority opinion, while Judge Newman wrote
a thorough, well-reasoned, and persuasive dissent. Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1326.
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state are per se irrelevant to the minimum contacts analysis in patent declar-
atory judgment actions.39° This is true, the majority claimed, even when the
products sold in the forum state are covered by the patent(s) in suit because
such contacts "do not, in the jurisdictional sense, relate in any material way
to the patent right that is at the center of any declaratory judgment claim for
... invalidity."39 ' In simple terms, the patent owner's commercial activities
did not give rise to or relate to the putative infringer's claim for declaratory
relief, and therefore the nexus requirement of the specific jurisdiction anal-
ysis was not met.392
The court then proceeded to announce a new "enforcement activities"
rule: only a patent owner's activities related to the enforcement of its patent
within the forum state can give rise to specific jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment action. 93 What is meant by enforcement activities? Well, of
course, sending a cease-and-desist letter is an enforcement activity, but the
Federal Circuit previously exempted that type of contact from the personal
jurisdiction analysis.394 So, what does that leave? According to the Avocent
majority, enforcement activities include: (1) judicial or extra-judicial patent
enforcement within the forum, such as prior infringement suits involving
the same patent; and (2) "exclusive license agreement[s] or other undertak-
ing[s] which impose[] enforcement obligations with a party residing or reg-
390 Id. at 1336. The Avocent court limited its decision to specific jurisdiction, stating that "it re-
mains unclear whether contacts based solely on the 'stream of commerce' may suffice to establish
general jurisdiction." Id. at 1331. After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Goodyear, however, it is
clear that the stream of commerce doctrine is limited to the specific jurisdiction context and will not
support the exercise of general jurisdiction even if a significant quantity of defendant's products are
entering the forum state. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
391 Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1336. But see Marta R. Vanegas, You Infringed My Patent, Now Wait
Until I Sue You: The Federal Circuit's Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp v. Aten International Co.,
92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 371, 390-91 (2010) (arguing that patentee's sales in the forum are
relevant to proving validity of the patent).
392 See Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1332. The majority reasoned as follows:
[l]n the context of an action for declaratory judgment... the patentee is the defendant, and
the claim asserted by the plaintiff relates to the "wrongful restraint [by the patentee] on the
free exploitation of non-infringing goods ... [such as] the threat of an infringement suit."
Thus, the nature of the claim in a declaratory judgment action is "to clear the air of infringe-
ment charges." Such a claim neither directly arises out of nor relates to the making, using, of-
fering to sell, selling, or importing of arguably infringing products in the forum, but instead
arises out of or relates to the activities of the defendant patentee in enforcing the patent or pa-
tents in suit.
Id. (second and third alteration in the original) (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson Halberstadt,
Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
393 id.
394 See supra Part IlI.B.2 (discussing the Federal Circuit's treatment of cease-and-desist letters for
jurisdictional purposes).
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ularly doing business in the forum." '395 The opinion leaves it for future cases
to determine what other activities, if any, might qualify as enforcement
activities for jurisdictional purposes.
Not long after Avocent, the Federal Circuit was presented with that
opportunity in Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Technology Ltd.96 Mir-
roring Avocent, in Autogenomics a foreign patent owner threatened a Cali-
fornia company with an infringement suit, the putative infringer filed a de-
claratory judgment action in California, and the patentee moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.397 In Autogenomics, however, the nature of
the patent owner's activities in the forum state was much more pervasive.
First, after the initial threat by the patent owner (Oxford), the parties in Au-
togenomics engaged in rather lengthy licensing negotiations.398 Besides
exchanging correspondence, two Oxford representatives flew to California
to meet with representatives of Autogenomics.399 Second, Oxford entered
into nonexclusive license agreements with other California companies re-
garding the patent-in-suit. 4° Third, Oxford representatives attended several
tradeshows in California concerning the same technology involved in the
declaratory judgment action.4"' Finally, as in Avocent, the patent owner sold
products in California related to the technology covered by the patent-in-
suit.402
Despite these significant forum-related activities, Autogenomics con-
cluded that the patent owner was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Cali-
fornia because none of these contacts constituted "enforcement activities"
under Avocent.4 °3 While the cease-and-desist letter and the licensing negoti-
ations were technically enforcement activities, they could not be considered
for policy reasons.' As for the other contacts-nonexclusive licenses, at-
tendance at trade shows, and sales of relevant products-the Autogenomics
majority held that they were not "enforcement activities.""4 5 Before coming
to that conclusion, though, the majority paused to comment on the policy
'9' Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1334.
396 566 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
397 Id. at 1014-15.
398 Id.
399 id.
400 Id. at 1015.
401 Id.
402 Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1015-16.
403 Id. at 1021.
404 Id. at 1019 (stating that license negotiations are analogous to cease-and-desist communications
and, thus, excluded from the personal jurisdiction analysis); see also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing
cease-and-desist letters in the personal jurisdiction analysis). But see Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle,
340 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that patentee was subject to personal jurisdiction in
California because it hired a California-based attorney to negotiate a patent license).
405 Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1020-21. Like Avocent, the panel in Autogenomics was divided.
Judges Moore and Gettleman (a district court judge sitting by designation) were in the majority, and
Judge Newman again wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1014.
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implications of Avocent: "[W]e too are concerned that foreign patentees like
Oxford may engage in significant commercialization and licensing efforts
in a state while benefiting from the shelter of the Avocent rule."' 6 The Au-
togenomics court also questioned "whether Avocent went further than Red
Wing Shoe required.""4 7 Nevertheless, Avocent was controlling law that the
panel was compelled to follow.4"8
The final case in this jurisprudential line is Radio Systems Corp. v. Ac-
cession, Inc.409 In Radio Systems, the patentee (a New Jersey corporation)
and the putative infringer (a Tennessee corporation), who were competitors
in the pet door business, engaged in extensive licensing negotiations over a
three-year period regarding U.S. Patent No. 7,207,141, or "the '141 pa-
tent. '41 0 During those negotiations, the patentee discovered that the PTO
issued a notice of allowance for a patent on one of Radio Systems' pet door
devices. 41' The patentee contacted the PTO to inform the examiner of the
'141 patent, and consequently the PTO withdrew the notice of allowance.
42
Radio Systems then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Tennessee, and the patent owner moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.4 3
The Federal Circuit held at the outset that the licensing negotiations
could not be considered for purposes of personal jurisdiction under Avocent
and Autogenomics.1 4 The real question, then, was whether the patentee
engaged in enforcement activities by contacting the PTO about Radio Sys-
tems' patent application.45 The court did not decide if this call to the PTO
qualified as an enforcement activity, because it focused instead on where
the call took place (i.e., from the patent owner's lawyer in New Jersey to
the PTO in Virginia).416 The plaintiff argued that the court's focus was mis-
directed-what matters is whether the patentee's enforcement activities
were targeted or intended to affect a party in Tennessee, not whether the
activities actually took place in Tennessee.4 7 Although the Supreme Court
has embraced this type of "effects test" theory of jurisdiction,4 8 the Federal
Circuit rejected it out of hand and concluded "that enforcement activities
406 ld. at 1021.
407 Id. at 1020 n.1.
408 id. at 1021.
409 638 F.3d 785 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
410 Id. at 787-88.
411 Id. at 787.
412 Id. at 788.
413 Id.
414 Id. at 790.
415 Radio Sys., 638 F.3d at 791-92.
416 Jd. at 792.
417 id.
418 See supra note 351 (discussing the effects test theory of personal jurisdiction).
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taking place outside the forum state do not give rise to personal jurisdiction
in the forum." '419
Together, Avocent, Autogenomics, and Radio Systems have whittled
away the scope of personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment ac-
tions to almost nothing. Even before these cases, it was difficult to prove
personal jurisdiction because of the exception for cease-and-desist letters,
4 20
but now it is close to impossible. Unless a patent owner is subject to general
jurisdiction,42' the only way a putative infringer may sue at home is if the
patent owner has previously filed infringement actions in the state involving
the same patent (or, possibly, the same technology), or if the patent owner
has entered an exclusive license agreement in the forum state that obligates
the licensee to enforce the patent.422 Parties wishing to challenge patents
who cannot satisfy these criteria may very well opt not to pursue declarato-
ry relief at all because their only choice is to sue in a distant and inconven-
ient forum.423
So, in the end, the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence with respect to
standing and personal jurisdiction shares at least one important commonali-
ty-the obstruction of affirmative patent validity challenges. Since the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that suits challenging suspect patents
should be facilitated and encouraged,424 this invites the obvious question
why the Federal Circuit has headed in the opposite direction. A simple an-
swer is that the Federal Circuit is a pro-patentee court.425 But this Article
proposes a different explanation in the next Part-that the Federal Circuit's
419 Radio Sys., 638 F.3d at 792.
420 See La Belle, supra note 110, at 82.
421 In Goodyear, the Supreme Court announced a revised standard that arguably will make it more
difficult to establish general jurisdiction going forward since the defendant will have to be "essentially
at home in the forum [s]tate." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
422 Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d. 1324, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
423 See Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("It is not explained why a California plaintiff should have to resort to a distant
forum, which is not alleged to have meaningful contacts with either party, to resolve a dispute that
centers upon actions by both the plaintiff and the foreign patentee in the state of California."); La Belle,
supra note 110, at 61-62 (arguing that restrictive rules regarding personal jurisdiction will discourage
patent validity challenges).
424 See supra Part II.B (discussing the long line of Supreme Court cases encouraging patent validi-
ty challenges).
425 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1459 (2010) ("One view is that
too many Federal Circuit decisions are decidedly pro-patent."); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wonder-
ing in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the
Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1306-07
(2011) ("[P]ublic choice theory and empirical evidence suggest that the Federal Circuit, as a court
specializing in patent adjudication, would be pro-patentee and inclined toward expanding the scope of
patentable subject matter.").
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doctrine stems from its inherently flawed view of patent validity disputes as
private, rather than public, law adjudication.
IV. PATENT VALIDITY CHALLENGES: A PUBLIC LAW APPROACH
The dichotomy between private law and public law is not absolute, as
there are legal regimes that straddle both worlds. Patent infringement
claims are a good example. The purpose of our patent system is public in
nature-to promote the progress of science and the useful arts for the bene-
fit of our citizenry.426 Yet, to achieve that end, we grant inventors certain
private rights, 427 we proscribe any violation of those rights, 428 and we rely
exclusively on private parties to police and enforce those rights through
civil infringement actions. 29 Thus, patent infringement is a crossbreed of
private and public law.
430
Patent validity disputes are of a different order, however. Questions of
validity, unlike infringement, lie at the heart of our patent system. Where a
patent is invalid, the quid pro quo of our patent system breaks down be-
cause the inventor gets his patent, but society gets nothing in return.43' So,
in a patent validity dispute, the issue is whether the government engaged in
wrongful conduct by granting the patent, not whether someone's private
rights were violated. Thus, as Part I of this Article demonstrated, patent
validity challenges share much in common with Professor Chayes's para-
digm for public law adjudication.432
Accepting as true that patent validity challenges are public law litiga-
tion, what does that mean going forward? This Article does not propose that
the Federal Circuit adopt special rules for public law litigation, generally, or
patent validity disputes, specifically. Nor does it suggest exempting validity
challenges from transsubstantive doctrines like standing and personal juris-
diction. My proposal is more modest. This Part argues that the Federal Cir-
cuit improperly views patent declaratory judgment actions through a private
law lens, and proposes ways for the court to effect a perspective shift. Once
426 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also Sichelman, supra note 75, at 9 ("In the United States, the
goal of patent law is to promote technological innovation.").
427 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (providing the requirements for a patent grant).
428 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ("[Wihoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
429 See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 470 (2011) (explaining that copyright and trademark infringement are subject
to criminal sanctions imposed by the government, but patent infringement is not).
430 See Sichelman, supra note 75, at 11-12.
431 See supra Part l.B (discussing the impact of invalid patents).
432 See supra Part l.B (demonstrating that patent validity disputes are public law adjudication).
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the Federal Circuit evaluates standing and personal jurisdiction from a pub-
lic law perspective, the flawed doctrinal architecture should self-correct.
A. The Private Law View of Validity Challenges
The distinction between private and public law adjudication has been
discussed at length in the literature.433 Courts, on the other hand, rarely (if
ever) announce whether they are treating certain disputes as matters of pub-
lic or private law, and the Federal Circuit is no exception. But a close look
at the Federal Circuit's declaratory judgment jurisprudence reveals the
court's bias toward private law judging of patent validity disputes.
1. Formalistic Rules
It is no secret that the Federal Circuit favors formalistic rules to more
holistic legal standards when deciding questions of patent law.434 The Fed-
eral Circuit has taken a bright-line approach to patentable subject matter,
obviousness, injunctive relief, claim construction, and prosecution history
estoppel. 3 Part III of this Article showed that the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion-making rubric for standing and personal jurisdiction in patent declara-
tory judgment actions is similarly formalistic, and so those can be added to
the list as well. The literature on the topic of formalism is rich, with schol-
ars debating the benefits and detriments of this trend at the Federal Cir-
cuit.436 The aim of this Article is not to wade into this debate, but to ask
what this formalistic trend can teach us about the Federal Circuit's outlook
on patent validity challenges.
While disagreement abounds as to the virtue of these bright-line rules,
there is consensus about their objective-they are intended to enhance "cer-
tainty, predictability, and doctrinal stability" in the law.437 The idea is that
433 See Chayes, supra note 58; Chayes, supra note 1; Fiss, supra note 52; Resnick, supra note 49;
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
434 See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 609, 611-12 (2009); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 25-26 (2010);
John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773-74 (2003).
435 Bilski v Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (holding that the Federal Circuit's "machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test" to prove patentable subject matter); Lee, supra note 434, at 29-40
(discussing the Federal Circuit's formalistic approach to various areas of patent law).
436 See Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1790 (2011) ("Sev-
eral commentators have bemoaned the Federal Circuit's embrace of rule formalism."); Lee, supra note
434, at 5-7 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's use of formalistic rules mitigates the burden on lay judges
and juries grappling with unfamiliar technologies in patent cases); Thomas, supra note 434, at 797-809
(exploring various negative consequences flowing from the Federal Circuit's formalistic approach).
437 Thomas, supra note 434, at 808.
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marking clear boundaries enables private parties to conduct themselves
within the limits of the law.438 "[R]ules are defined ... [by] the ease with
which private parties can predict how the law will apply to their con-
duct."'439
The Federal Circuit's categorical rules as to standing and personal ju-
risdiction are meant for exactly this purpose. With respect to standing, pa-
tent owners know that as long as no affirmative acts are directed at the
plaintiff, there will be no standing to sue under Myriad.4' And the Federal
Circuit's personal jurisdiction rules have similar effects-patent owners
know that as long as they do not engage in any qualifying enforcement ac-
tivities within a forum state, they will not be subject to a declaratory judg-
ment suit there." These formalistic requirements operate conjunctively to
help patent owners predict if, when, and where they might be sued for de-
claratory relief.
Formalism aspires to improve predictability and certainty by regulat-
ing the conduct of private parties, and so it maps onto the private law model
of adjudication." 2 Yet, patent validity disputes do not concern private-party
conduct; the question instead is whether the government engaged in wrong-
ful conduct by granting the patent-in-suit."3 What is more, patent validity
disputes implicate the rights of many besides the private parties before the
court-competitors, consumers, and the public at large all have a stake in
the outcome of these suits.4" Thus, the Federal Circuit's trend toward for-
malism evidences the court's inherently inaccurate view of patent validity
challenges as private law, rather than public law, adjudication.
438 See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841 (1972) ("[lIt is
on the whole wise legal policy to use rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior because
they are more certain than [standards]."); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) ("[A]nother obvious advantage of establishing as soon as possible [clear and
definite rules]: predictability.... Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have
the means of knowing what it prescribes.").
439 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 513
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
440 See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the impact of Myriad on standing in patent declaratory judg-
ment actions).
441 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Federal Circuit's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the
patent declaratory judgment context).
442 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
926 (2003) ("In private law, formalism is proposed as a means of providing economic actors with clear
end-game rules that reduce uncertainty and promote efficiency."); Jonathan Yovel, Relational Formal-
ism and the Construction of Financial Instruments, 48 Am. Bus. L.J. 371, 402-03 (2011) ("[lI]t is exact-
ly the typical reliance relations involved that may require a stricter brand of formalism in some areas of
private law.").
443 See supra Part .B (expounding on the public law attributes of patent validity disputes).
444 See id.
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2. Litigant-Centricity
Another indicator of the Federal Circuit's private law bias in patent
declaratory judgment actions is what I call the court's "litigant-centricity."
Litigant-centricity refers to the tendency of the Federal Circuit to concen-
trate its standing and personal jurisdiction inquiries exclusively on the
plaintiff and defendant before the court without regard for other parties
impacted by the litigation. This concept of litigant-centricity, I argue, is
rooted in private law theory."5
Litigant-centricity is best elucidated by example. Starting with stand-
ing, the Federal Circuit's test requires proof of two things: (1) an affirma-
tive act directed at the plaintiff by the patentee related to the enforcement of
patent rights; and (2) meaningful preparation by the plaintiff to conduct
potentially infringing activity." 6 Both of these questions fix on the individ-
ual litigants, either alone or in relationship to each other. Yet, the Federal
Circuit's test blatantly ignores the public's interest in patent validity dis-
putes.
Even before issuing its decision in Myriad, the Federal Circuit re-
vealed this litigant-centric view of standing during oral arguments. In re-
sponse to plaintiffs' argument that potential competitors should have stand-
ing to challenge bad patents, Judge Kimberly Moore asked:
Do you not recognize the profound impact that [it] would have on our patent system if any-
one who was ready, willing, and able to compete tomorrow could bring a [declaratory judg-
ment] action against the patentee in any forum of their choosing without any affirmative act
directed at all towards them by the patentee?
447
And Judge Moore seemed equally troubled by the district judge's decision
to afford standing to consumers: "[T]o reach individual people who want
cheaper access to products seems to me . . . so broad as to allow any person
that wants a cheaper product in any case to sue .... Apple and Microsoft
and everybody else would be sued by every consumer out there."" 8 This
Article will address Judge Moore's concerns shortly, but for now these ex-
cerpts are meant to highlight the litigant-centricity of the court's standing
445 See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT (Craig
Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 Hous. L. REV. 215, 394 (2009) ("The problem with privatizing copyright
law is that private law is limited to the interests of the parties."); Michael Wells, Constitutional Reme-
dies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157, 192-93 (1998) (noting the private law's
focus on the parties to the lawsuit).
446 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub
nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
447 Oral Argument at 31:22, Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329 (No. 2010-1406) (Apr. 4, 2011
recording), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/2010-1406/all.
448 ld at 9:07.
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analysis. The court is worried only about patentees and how they might be
affected by relaxed standing requirements. There is no mention of the pri-
vate attorney general plaintiffs or the social welfare, even though the Su-
preme Court has long recognized the "strong public interest in permitting
accused infringers to challenge invalid or unenforceable patents."" 9 In
short, the Federal Circuit has implemented a private law model of stand-
ing.
450
The court's approach to personal jurisdiction is similarly litigant-
centric. The ordinary personal jurisdiction rubric inquires about the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum state, yet it leaves room for other considera-
tions like fairness and reasonableness.45" ' The Federal Circuit's rigid and
inflexible test, on the other hand, is singularly focused on the parties before
the court. Take, for instance, the Federal Circuit's exemption of cease-and-
desist letters from the minimum contacts analysis. 2 The court crafted this
exemption in order to promote the out-of-court settlement of patent dis-
putes.4 53 While grounding this exemption in fairness,454 the court was only
concerned with what was fair for the parties, not the consuming public.
"[S]ettlement may advantage the private parties involved in the case, [but]
the real benefit to the public comes when patent cases are litigated because
that is the only way to invalidate bad patents." '455
The Federal Circuit's litigant-centricity is further demonstrated by its
more recent pronouncement that "enforcement activities" are the sine qua
non of personal jurisdiction in suits affirmatively testing patent validity.456
This new test fixates on the parties, particularly the patent owner, and pays
no regard to the public's interest or other principles of fairness. Indeed, the
court itself has admitted that this test raises concerns that nonresident pa-
tentees may engage in and benefit from significant conduct in a forum state,
449 Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., dissent-
ing) (citing a long line of Supreme Court decisions).
450 See Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The Standing of Municipali-
ties in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 7, 8 (2010) (defining a "private-law model" of standing as one that espouses a narrow, traditional
view of standing focusing on the individual litigant before the court); Hessick, supra note 237, at 296-99
(describing the private rights model of standing).
451 See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
452 See, e.g., Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
453 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Federal Circuit's justification for this exemption from
standard personal jurisdiction doctrine).
454 See, e.g., Red Wing Shoe, 148 F.3d at 1360-61 (holding that it would not comport with princi-
ples of fairness to ground jurisdiction in cease-and-desist letters alone).
455 La Belle, supra note 110, at 88.
456 See supra Part Ill.B.3 (explaining the Federal Circuit's recent narrowing of the personal juris-
diction doctrine in patent declaratory judgment suits).
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yet still be shielded from suits challenging their patents. 57 Such a construct
has considerable social welfare implications, as it means fewer suspect pa-
tents will be challenged and invalidated in court. But since the Federal Cir-
cuit regards declaratory judgment actions as private law disputes, the only
interests that matter to it are those of the individual litigants.45
The bottom line is that the Federal Circuit's unsound approach to
standing and personal jurisdiction is predicated on its myopic view of pa-
tent declaratory judgment actions as private law disputes. What is needed,
then, is a shift in perspective to encompass the public good. The Supreme
Court, fortunately, has already provided the framework for this shift, and so
implementation is all that is left for the Federal Circuit.
B. The Public Law View of Validity Challenges
It admittedly would be difficult to persuade the Federal Circuit that,
because patent validity disputes are public law adjudication, it ought to
completely overhaul its standing and personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in
declaratory judgment actions. Such a radical proposal is unnecessary, how-
ever, because the Supreme Court's current standards make this perspective
shift relatively easy. For both standing and personal jurisdiction, the Court
has embraced flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances standards that require
consideration of various factors, including the public good.
1. Standing in Declaratory Judgment Actions
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court held that questions of standing in
patent declaratory judgment actions must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.459 The inquiry "'is whether the facts alleged, under all the circum-
stances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment."'46 No doubt Medlmmune contem-
plates serious consideration of the public interest in this totality-of-the-
457 Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[W]e
too are concerned that foreign patentees like Oxford may engage in significant commercialization and
licensing efforts in a state while benefiting from the shelter of the Avocent rule."); see also Viam Corp.
v. Iowa Exp.-Imp. Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 429-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that fairness weighs in
favor of exercising jurisdiction "[o]therwise, out-of-state corporations would be able to set up domestic
fronts through which they could do business without subjecting their patents to the rigorous scrutiny
demanded by United States patent law").
458 Cf PATTERSON & BIRCH, supra note 445, at 394 ("The problem with privatizing copyright law
is that private law is limited to the interests of the parties.").
459 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
460 Id. (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
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circumstances analysis.46 ' The Supreme Court has long recognized the so-
cial welfare benefit of affirmative patent challenges and has consistently
adopted legal standards that encourage and support these suits. 42 In the
same vein, Medlmmune relaxed standing requirements in order to facilitate
patent declaratory judgment actions. Medlmmune, therefore, should be seen
as a continuation and extension of these earlier Supreme Court cases that
make social welfare a clear priority in patent validity disputes.
Notably, in at least one other context, the Supreme Court defers to the
public good when deciding questions of standing. In First Amendment cas-
es, the Court relaxes traditional standing requirements so that third parties
may challenge vague or overbroad statutes. 63 The concern justifying this
"overbreadth doctrine" is that vague statutes could have a chilling effect on
speech, meaning citizens might censor themselves to avoid criminal prose-
cution.4" An analogy can be drawn here to invalid patents. Invalid patents,
like overbroad statutes, have a chilling effect on conduct.465 Just as speakers
may censor themselves for fear of criminal prosecution, competitors may
refrain from manufacturing and selling certain products because they fear
an infringement suit. And while the overbreadth doctrine has traditionally
been limited to First Amendment cases,466 it is arguably appropriate in pa-
tent cases where important constitutional rights are at stake.467
Now assuming the Federal Circuit accepts this invitation and relaxes
standing, what to make of Judge Moore's concerns about the "profound
impact" this would have on our patent system?468 She warns about potential
competitors suing "in any forum of their choosing without any affirmative
act directed at all towards them by the patentee" and predicts that compa-
461 See Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1027 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The evolving law under
Medimmune facilitates challenge to adversely held patents."); Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,
495 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing the long line of Supreme Court deci-
sions, including Medlmmune, holding that "[t]here is a strong public interest in permitting accused
infringers to challenge invalid or unenforceable patents"); Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 197, at
973 ("Medlmmune appears to create new avenues for courts to police the implementation of patent law
and to release advances that should not have been patented into the public domain.").
462 See supra Part II.B (discussing the long line of Supreme Court cases encouraging and facilitat-
ing the affirmative testing of suspect patents).
463 See CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 255, at 89-91.
464 See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
465 See supra Part l.B (addressing how "scarecrow" patents can be used to quash competition).
466 CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 255, at 90.
467 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 1 realize this analogy raises several questions about the pur-
pose of the overbreadth doctrine and whether it is properly cabined within the First Amendment context.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the prudential limitation on third-party standing,
whereas the Federal Circuit claims its standing analysis in Myriad and similar cases is constitutionally
based. See supra note 255 (discussing constitutional versus prudential standing requirements). For now,
however, I bracket these difficult questions and leave them for future work.
468 Oral Argument, supra note 447, at 31:22.
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nies like Apple and Microsoft "would be sued by every consumer out
there."469 What about public interest organizations like the ACLU and
PUBPAT? What would really happen if it was easier for them to sue for
declaratory relief in patent cases?
Surely a relaxation of the standing doctrine would bring some changes
to our patent system-in fact, that is precisely what the MedImmune Court
intended. And, of course, it is public rights, not private rights, that are par-
amount to our patent system, so the fact that patent owners may be nega-
tively affected by relaxed standing requirements are of secondary im-
portance. In any event, these changes are unlikely to turn our patent system
on its head as Judge Moore suggests. As Part II of this Article discussed,
there are a litany of reasons why parties do not challenge patents in federal
court.47° These disincentives-including the lack of a financial reward, the
risk of an infringement suit, and the high cost of litigation-would act as a
check to prevent the floodgates on patent declaratory judgment actions from
opening. So, relaxing the standing requirement to allow for greater third-
party participation in validity disputes will not catastrophically impact our
patent system.
2. Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions
With respect to personal jurisdiction, shifting to a public law approach
should likewise be fairly straightforward for the Federal Circuit. The Su-
preme Court's analytical framework for personal jurisdiction is sufficiently
supple to provide courts with wide discretion regarding fairness and reason-
ableness.47" ' While the Court has identified five specific fairness factors,4" it
has made clear that this is a nonexhaustive list and that the court may take
other things into account.473 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has previously ac-
cepted this invitation to exempt cease-and-desist letters from the minimum
contacts analysis based on fairness principles.474 Yet, as I have argued in
earlier work, that exemption promotes the out-of-court settlement of patent
suits, which may be in the best interests of the parties, but ignores the pub-
469 Id. at 9:07, 31:22.
470 See supra Part I.C (describing the many disincentives that parties wishing to challenge patents
face).
471 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476-78 (1985).
472 The factors include: (1) "the burden on the defendant"; (2) "the forum State's interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute"; (3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief'; (4) "the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies"; and (5)
the states' "shared interest ... in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Id. at 477 (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
471 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
474 Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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lic's interest in having patent suits litigated to judgment so that bad patents
are eliminated.475 Were the Federal Circuit to view patent validity disputes
properly-meaning as public law litigation-it would conclude that this
exemption for cease-and-desist letters is unsound on both doctrinal and
policy grounds.
47 6
Nor would the Federal Circuit's enforcement activities test conform to
a public law approach for patent declaratory judgment actions. By the
court's own admission, this test leads to unfair results because it discounts
the public's interest in invalidating bad patents, and permits "foreign pa-
tentees to shield themselves from domestic litigation." '477 This is particularly
troubling in light of the fact that more than half of U.S. patents are granted
to foreign entities. 478 Apparently, however, the Federal Circuit believed it
could not take these fairness concerns into account once it determined the
defendant's contacts with the forum state were insufficient. 47 9 But even if
the Federal Circuit was right about the defendant's contacts, 480 fairness con-
siderations may "serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a
lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."48'
In other words, had the Federal Circuit approached this jurisdictional ques-
tion from a public law perspective-considering all factors (especially the
public interest)-the outcome would have been different.
Because patent validity challenges are akin to public law adjudication,
this Article urges the Federal Circuit to move toward a public law paradigm
for standing and personal jurisdiction in declaratory judgment actions. To
effect that shift, the Federal Circuit first needs to embrace the Supreme
Court's holistic standards, while resisting the promise of predictability and
certainty that comes with formalistic rules. Once embraced, those holistic
standards ought to be faithfully implemented, meaning the court must con-
sider all the circumstances when deciding questions of standing and person-
al jurisdiction. Of particular importance to both of these analyses is the pub-
lic's interest because of the social welfare implications of bad patents.
Thus, by viewing patent validity disputes through this public law model, the
475 La Belle, supra note 110, at 88 ("[S]ettlement may advantage the private parties involved in the
case, [but] the real benefit to the public comes when patent cases are litigated because that is the only
way to invalidate bad patents.").
476 See id at 86-95 (analyzing the Federal Circuit's approach to personal jurisdiction in patent
declaratory judgment actions in light of all the fairness factors).
477 Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
478 Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1028 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(stating that in 2008 more than 50 percent of granted patents were issued to foreign patentees).
479 Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1339 ("Although we expressed concerns in Viam regarding improper
attempts by foreign patentees to shield themselves from domestic litigation . . . we cannot ignore the
framework for determining jurisdiction within a given forum." (citation omitted)).
480 See Vanegas, supra note 391, at 390-91 (arguing that patentee's sales in the forum are relevant
to proving validity of the patent).
481 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,477 (1985).
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Federal Circuit will remedy its flawed doctrinal architecture regarding
standing and personal jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment actions.
That brings us to the final Part of this Article, which discusses the re-
cently enacted America Invents Act and the sense of urgency it creates. The
Supreme Court, Congress, and the President have all recognized the impact
of poor quality patents and the benefits of affirmative patent validity chal-
lenges, so the time has come for the Federal Circuit to follow their lead.
V. A CALL FOR PROMPT REFORM
The bad patent problem in this country is not new. Scholars and poli-
cymakers have been discussing this phenomenon for years and have pro-
posed various solutions.482 What is new, however, is that some of these pro-
posals for reform have become law. Not only has the Supreme Court re-
sponded to the call for reform by reversing the Federal Circuit in a number
of important decisions,483 but now Congress and the President have weighed
in on the issue as well by enacting the America Invents Act-the most
comprehensive patent reform legislation in more than fifty years.484
The AIA affects many areas of patent law, including substantive and
procedural issues relating to both patent prosecution and litigation. Yet,
there are common themes running through this legislation that are critical to
the thesis of this Article. First, the legislation recognizes that "questionable
patents are too easily obtained."4 5 Second, Congress believed that invalid
482 La Belle, supra note 110, at 52 & n.56 (summarizing criticism of the patent system and various
proposed reforms).
483 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 634-35, 638 (2008) (reversing the
Federal Circuit and holding that patent exhaustion applies to method patents when the essential or in-
ventive feature of the invention is embodied in the product); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418-19 (2007) (easing the obviousness standard by holding that the Federal Circuit's "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" test for obviousness should be flexibly applied, not as "rigid and mandatory
formulas"); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) (rejecting "the Federal
Circuit's 'reasonable apprehension of suit' test," and thus making it easier for alleged infringers to
challenge patents via declaratory relief); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92
(2006) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against
patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances" because such categorical grants of relief are
erroneous, and holding instead that the Federal Circuit should apply the traditional test for injunctive
relief "[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreo-
ver, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., a trademark case in-
volving a question of standing. No. 11-982, 2012 WL 425184 (June 25, 2012). Specifically, the question
presented to the Court is "[w]hether a federal district court is divested of Article Ill jurisdiction over a
party's challenge to the validity of a federally registered trademark if the registrant promises not to
assert its mark against the party's then-existing commercial activities." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., No. 11-982 (2012), 2012 WL 441275. No doubt the decision in Nike could
have serious implications for patent law.
484 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
485 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39(2011).
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patents "are too difficult to challenge," and so the ALA aims to "provid[e] a
more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have is-
sued.""4 6 Third, the AIA expands the opportunities for third-party participa-
tion in the patent system.487 And most importantly, the stated purpose of the
AIA is to "promote innovation by granting inventors temporally limited
monopolies on their inventions in a manner that ultimately benefits the pub-
lic.
4 88
Highlighting a few key provisions of the AIA shows how Congress in-
tends to accomplish these ends. For starters, the AIA precludes the patent-
ing of certain types of inventions deemed of questionable validity.489 The
AIA also increases the opportunities to police patents ex ante by allowing
third parties to submit potentially invalidating prior art to the PTO before a
patent is issued 9.49  Finally, the AIA creates various mechanisms for chal-
lenging already-issued patents at the PTO, including post-grant review,
491
inter partes review,492 and a special proceeding for business method pa-
tents.493 Notably, the post-grant and inter partes reviews may be initiated by
any person other than the owner of the patent, meaning competitors, con-
sumers, advocacy groups, or other members of the interested public have
the ability to affirmatively test patents at the PTO.494
Thus, the intentions of Congress and the President (as embodied in the
AIA) align perfectly with the objectives of this Article's proposal-to facil-
itate and encourage patent validity challenges in order to benefit the public
good. But even though the AIA represents a significant step in the right
direction, it does not go far enough. Older patents, for example, will not be
subject to post-grant review since the proceeding must be initiated shortly
after the patent is issued;4 95 furthermore, the scope of inter partes review is
486 Id. at 39-40.
487 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6, § 311, 125 Stat. at 299 (allowing for third parties to
submit prior art to the PTO pre-issuance and to initiate post-grant reviews to challenge patents).
488 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 40 (emphasis added).
489 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 14, 125 Stat. at 327 (deeming tax strategies as within
the prior art and, therefore, unpatentable).
490 Id. sec. 8, 125 Stat. at315-16.
491 Id. sec. 6, § 321, 125 Stat. at 306.
492 Id. sec. 6, § 311, 125 Stat. at 299.
493 id. sec. 18, 125 Stat. at 329-31.
494 Id. sec. 6, § 311, 125 Stat. at 299. Unlike in federal court, there is no need for the challengers to
demonstrate standing in administrative proceedings before the PTO. However, the AIA allows any party
dissatisfied with the decision in post-grant review or inter partes review to appeal directly to the Federal
Circuit. Id. sec. 6, §§ 319, 329, 125 Stat. at 304, 311. This raises an interesting question about how a
party that could not establish standing to sue for declaratory relief in federal court could challenge a
patent at the PTO and then end up in federal court on appeal. This looming question provides even
greater incentive for courts to clarify the doctrine of standing in patent cases.
495 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 6, § 321(c), 125 Stat. at 306 (post-grant review must be
initiated within nine months of the patent grant).
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limited to only a few validity defenses.496 Consequently, robust privately
initiated federal court litigation will remain indispensable in the effort to
eradicate bad patents. So the sooner the Federal Circuit recognizes and
treats patent validity challenges as public law litigation, the better for the
patent system, innovation, and society at large.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with the normative premise that the primary pur-
pose of our patent system, as contemplated by the Constitution itself, is to
benefit the public. From there, it challenged the conventional wisdom that
patent validity disputes are private law litigation and demonstrated that they
fit within the well-defined public law litigation paradigm. It then asked why
our patent system lacks robust litigation challenging invalid patents, where-
as other public law regimes rely heavily on private enforcement of public
rights. It highlighted, in particular, recent struggles of the ACLU and
PUBPAT to challenge controversial patents on gene sequences and trans-
genic seed that are considered by many as particularly dangerous to the
public good.
Although scholars have discussed the many pragmatic difficulties im-
peding affirmative patent testing, few have explored the doctrinal barriers
to declaratory relief. This Article has identified standing and personal juris-
diction as significant threshold requirements that patent challengers often
are unable to overcome because the Federal Circuit has interpreted and ap-
plied these doctrines in a formalistic and litigant-centric manner. I argue
that the Federal Circuit has adopted these unsound rules because it wrongly
views patent validity challenges through the lens of a private law model. To
effect a perspective shift, the Federal Circuit ought to be mindful of the
significant social welfare interests implicated by patent validity challenges.
Once espousing a public law vision of the patent system, the Federal Cir-
cuit's declaratory judgment jurisprudence should evolve naturally to en-
courage and facilitate patent validity challenges, just as the Supreme Court,
Congress, and the President all agree it should.
496 Id. sec. 6, § 311(b), 125 Stat. at 299 (patents in inter panes review may only be challenged
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103).
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